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UNSEX CEDAW: WHAT’S WRONG WITH “WOMEN’S RIGHTS”
Darren RosenblumΦ
ABSTRACT
Although the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (“CEDAW” or the “Convention”) has succeeded in some
respects, even its supporters acknowledge broad failures. CEDAW’s weakness
draws on the titular mistaken diagnosis: “women” are not the issue⎯gender
disparities are. The 1970’s drafting of CEDAW focused on bringing women to
their place at the international law table.1 What’s wrong with women’s rights? In
the international context, CEDAW attempts to empower women but fails to
respect other gender inequality. As the preeminent treaty on gender inequality,
CEDAW cannot succeed in creating gender equality if its scope remains limited
to women. Men are external to core debates over gender inequality. CEDAW’s
focus on “women” enshrines the male/female binary in international law, when it
should seek the elimination of the categories themselves. Under this model,
women are the victims, while men are presumed to be the perpetrators. Catharine
MacKinnon recently asked “Are women human?,”2 and CEDAW’s answer, by its
existence outside of human rights, is that they are not. The Convention removes
women’s issues from human rights discussions, isolating their concerns. The
identitarian category of “women” serves to reify rather than undermine gender
disparities. For international law to foster gender equality, it is imperative that
CEDAW undergo a radical refashioning.
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See Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, September 4-15, 1995, Progress
Achieved in the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, ¶¶ 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/7 (June 21, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm [hereinafter Beijing Conference].
2
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES
(2006) [hereinafter MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?].
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INTRODUCTION
As Lady Macbeth gathers the strength to achieve her evil ends, she
implores the spirits to “unsex me here.”3 She believes that losing her identity as a
woman will empower her. So, too, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW” or the “Convention”) must
lose its focus on “women” to realize its potency.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (“CEDAW” or the “Convention”), signed on July 17, 1980 by sixty-four
countries,4 has as its principal goals the protection and promotion of the rights of
women and the elimination of discrimination against women.5 As of May 26,
2009, 186 countries⎯more than ninety percent of United Nations’ members⎯are
parties to the Convention.6 The most notable non-party to the Convention is the
United States.7 In addition, as of May 26, 2009, there are seventy-nine
Signatories and ninety-seven Parties to the Optional Protocol.8 However,
CEDAW has faced substantial criticism as an insignificant international treaty.9
CEDAW’s weakness arises from its mistaken diagnosis: “women” may be
some of the victims of inequality, but gender disparities should be the focus of the
Convention. As I have argued elsewhere, CEDAW, the preeminent international
treaty on gender relations, has achieved a great deal at the level of international
law and in signatory countries’ enforcement, but it has not done enough.10
CEDAW’s focus on women hobbles its efficacy in battling gender inequality.
Neither feminist theory nor international law theory has approached the
question of women’s role in CEDAW with an analytical perspective. Instead,
CEDAW has been analyzed as “Governance Feminism,” the engagement of
feminist efforts in the governance of a wide variety of regulatory forms, from
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As Lady Macbeth prepares to murder Duncan, she says: “The raven himself is hoarse/That
croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan/Under my battlements. Come, you spirits/That tend on mortal
thoughts, unsex me here/And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full/Of direst cruelty. Make
thick my blood.” William Shakespeare, MACBETH, act 1, sc. 5. Thanks to Bridget Crawford for
the reference.
4
United Nations, Short History of CEDAW Convention,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
5
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) art. 1,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
6
See
UN
Treaty
Collection:
CEDAW
Participants,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (follow Chapter IV hyperlink; then follow
Section 8 hyperlink) (last visited May 26, 2009) [hereinafter CEDAW Participants].
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See infra Part I.
10
See generally Darren Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender: Why International Law Theory Should
Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 759 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenblum,
Internalizing Gender].
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states to quasi-state institutions.11 Janet Halley, in her work on international
criminal law, criticized “Governance Feminism” for its push to eliminate consent
as a defense to genocidal rape.12 According to Halley, Governance Feminists rely
on an excessive criminalization of sexuality in which some contact may be
consensual.13 This example demonstrates how Governance Feminism’s havoc
falls on men, which has led Halley to “take a break from feminism.”14
This anti-identitarian impulse is correct insofar as strict adherence to
identity may lead to unintended consequences, but it does not require the
abandonment of all feminist goals. CEDAW’s focus on “women” exalts the
men/women binary to the core of international law, when the goal of gender
equality would be better served by seeking the elimination of the categories
themselves. To move gender equality into the mainstream of international law,
feminist scholars must critique CEDAW with the most substantial anti-essentialist
and anti-identitarian perspectives.
This study centers on a textual analysis of CEDAW rather than an
examination of the CEDAW Committee’s work or interpretations among
signatories. Although that extensive material holds much fruit for further analysis
of the Convention’s questionable reliance on identity, such a study demands
further research and analysis.
This Article continues my project of challenging the intersections between
liberal constitutional theory and international and comparative notions of equality
and identity.15 Variations in identity constructions across cultural lines define
liberal remedies for group inequality. Fuller understandings of remedies for
inequality such as quotas has compelled me to think more deeply about the
relationship between universalist constitutionalism and equality between and
among identity categories.16 In particular, I have closely examined France’s
Parity Law, which requires political parties name women as half of their
candidates for public office;17 Brazil’s Quota Law, which requires thirty percent
of political parties be comprised of women;18 and Norway’s Corporate Board
Quota, which sets a floor of forty percent for either gender on publicly-listed
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See Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the
International Law of Armed Conflict, 9 MELBOURNE J. OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78, 79 (2008).
12
Id. at 78.
13
Id.
14
See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006) [hereinafter HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS].
15
Fourteen years ago, I began a line of inquiry related to identity with a queer interrogation of
“lesbian and gay” identity. Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of
Lesbian and Gay “Victories,” 4 L. & SEXUALITY 83 (1995).
16
See generally Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based
Equality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2008) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Loving Gender
Balance].
17
See Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of
Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2006).
18
See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10.
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corporate boards of directors.19 This Article continues the exploration of identity
in focusing on an interrogation of the term “women” as deployed by international
law. It brings this anti-essentialist interpretation of gender equality to bear on
international law, moving it beyond the identitarian category of “women.”
First, I will present the broad range of critiques that amply demonstrate
CEDAW’s failure to meet its own goals. Second, I posit that a core reason for the
Convention’s failures lays in the centrality of “women” in the text. Third,
CEDAW mistakenly targets the problem as discrimination, when a broader array
of disparities is at hand. Fourth, this discrimination model presumes a perpetrator
of discrimination—presumably “men”—when a far broader power construct is at
issue. I conclude by arguing that this series of counterproductive engagements
suggests the need for a radical refashioning of this crucial treaty.
I.

CEDAW’s Failures and Successes

The drafters of CEDAW sought to situate women’s rights as a preeminent
Women throughout the world confronted sexist
international concern.20
institutions, and the drafters’ goals centered on bringing international law to
ameliorate these harms.21 Human rights endeavors begin with universalist ideas
of law’s potential to protect the weak from the strong, and CEDAW is no
exception.22 This Section discusses the Convention’s failures and successes
briefly, setting the stage for the discussion of its potential.
Although CEDAW faces many failures as one of the most aspirational of
international treaties, its subtle-at-best enforcement methods and the many
reservations of its signatories limit its efficacy.23 Despite these shortcomings,
CEDAW has achieved some internalization within national legal systems.24

19

See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: The Economic Imperative for Women’s Corporate
Leadership, BERKELEY BUS. L J. (anticipated 2009) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital].
20
See Beijing Conference, supra note 1.
21
Id.
22
The United Nations, for example, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
The Preamble proclaims that its member states have pledged to promote “universal respect for
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” U.N. Charter preamble, para. 6.
23
See Jennifer Riddle, Note, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s Reservation
Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 605 (2002) [hereinafter Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal]. “Of the United Nations’
human rights treaties, CEDAW has attracted the greatest number of reservations with the potential
to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty.” Id. at 606. As of 2002, fifty-five
States had reservations to CEDAW, and another fourteen States had ultimately withdrawn
reservations they had initially filed. See id. at 606; see also Adia Gonzales Martinez, Human
Rights of Women, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 157, 175 (2001); Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 299, 337-40 (1995); Kerry L. Ritz, Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a
Remedy for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 25
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 191, 207-208 (2001).
24
See generally Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10 (analyzing the process by which
Brazil and France internalized CEDAW article 7).
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Thinking about gender or sex beyond just “women” would foster a broader basis
for support and interest in CEDAW’s implementation.
Like many other human rights conventions, CEDAW authorizes broad
reservations that allow many of the signatories to exempt themselves from nearly
all of the provisions in the Convention.25 For example, Saudi Arabia has only just
begun to debate whether to allow women to drive, yet it is a signatory to
CEDAW.26 Such major reservations reduce CEDAW to a Convention centered
on reporting alone. While reporting compels countries to measure compliance, it
cannot force change. CEDAW’s “soft” law status parallels other human rights
treaties, but its weak enforcement mechanisms and lack of resources cripple it.
Cultural differences accentuate these shortcomings, as I have argued.27 Despite
these limitations, the Convention has succeeded in certain limited contexts in
legitimizing and even institutionalizing women’s rights.28
At its inception, CEDAW only provided two procedures, the interstate
procedure and the reporting procedure, to monitor State Parties’ compliance with
CEDAW’s mandates.29 Article 29 of CEDAW, the interstate procedure, provides
for a resolution to conflicting interpretations and applications of the Convention
between State Parties.30 It states that disputes arising out of differing
interpretations and applications are first put to arbitration to negotiate a solution to
the dispute.31 Barring a resolution within six months, the dispute can ultimately
be sent to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a final decision.32 However,
State Parties often rely on the principle of non-intervention in other States’
internal affairs and avoid initiating procedures to evade the possible retaliatory
effects.33 More importantly, any State can refuse to be held to the procedure,
making this provision a central source of CEDAW’s weakness.34 These many
25

Reservations are allowed if they are “not incompatible with the object and purpose of
the…Convention.” Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 767 (quoting Laboni
Amena Hoq, Note, The Women’s Convention and its Optional Protocol: Empowering Women to
Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677, 688 (2001)
[hereinafter The Women’s Convention]). However, the Convention provides no means to ensure
compliance. See id. Moreover, states can independently determine what “appropriate means” are
necessary for their compliance. Under such conditions, a state party can has little to no risk of
being sanctioned. See Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal, supra note 23, at 630.
26
Hassan M. Fattah, Saudi Arabia Debates Women’s Right to Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007,
at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/middleeast/27cnd-drive.html.
27
See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10.
28
Id.
29
The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 684. Critics have argued that (prior to the Optional
Protocol) CEDAW lacked a complaint and communication process designed to allow nongovernmental organizations or individuals to bring complaints against State Parties for violations
of the Convention. See Ernst, supra note 23, at 337-40.
30
The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 684.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 685. The interstate reporting procedure, set forth in Article 18, obliges State Parties to
submit an initial report within one year of ratification of the Convention, followed by periodic
reports at least once every four years. Id. The reports must include the steps the State has taken to
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roadblocks to efficacy have led to the reality that no state has ever engaged the
interstate procedure35—clear evidence of its meaninglessness.
Reliance on state reporting hampers the Convention’s enforcement, as
state parties often fail to report at all, submit reports that are inaccurate or tardy,
or both.36 State parties have little incentive to portray the status of women
accurately.37 Moreover, Article 20 limits CEDAW’s consideration of country
reports to two weeks, a time period too short to permit thorough analysis.38 The
CEDAW Committee’s reviewing reports and making general recommendations
reflects its lack of substantial authority.39
Facing CEDAW’s enforcement failures, international women’s rights
advocates pushed the forty-third session of the Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW) to adopt the Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention in
March 1999.40 The Protocol offers two new mechanisms to hold governments
accountable to their Convention obligations: 1) the communications procedure,
which provides individuals and groups the right to lodge complaints with
CEDAW regarding States’ violations of the Convention’s terms; and 2) the
inquiry procedure, which enables CEDAW to conduct inquiries into States’
serious and systematic abuses of women’s human rights.41 Although the Protocol
allows CEDAW to initiate investigations against State parties, the Convention

integrate the Convention into domestic laws and policies and the difficulties the State has faced in
upholding the Convention. Id. These reports are submitted to CEDAW, which examines the
reports. Id. Article 17 gives specific authority to CEDAW to review State Parties’ reports and
scrutinize their implementation and adherence to the Convention before the international
community, and, if needed, CEDAW may issue general recommendations regarding the nature
and extent of State Parties’ compliance. See id.; see also Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a
Mechanism to Enforce Women’s Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence in the
Americas, 34 HARV. INT’L L. J. 507, 529 (1993). However, CEDAW may not impose sanctions
for noncompliance with the Convention or engage in any form of arbitration between State Parties,
or an individual and a State Party, regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention.
See Ritz, supra note 23, at 204; see also The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 685.
35
MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 2, at 305.
36
See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 687; see also Kathryn Christine Arnold, Note,
Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting Away with Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian
Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1343, 1390 (2001). The author discusses CEDAW’s
failure to enforce the provision set forth in the Convention requiring State parties to submit reports
to the Committee. See id. The author gives an example of Jordan, the subject of the author’s
discussion, as a country that rarely submits the requisite reports and when the Jordanian
government submits the reports, the information in the reports is inaccurate. See id.
37
See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 687.
38
See id.; see also Ernst, supra note 23, at 340, 346-48.
39
See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 687; see also Ernst, supra note 23, at 340; Ritz,
supra note 23, at 205.
40
See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 683.
41
See id. at 678; see also Riddle, supra note 23; see also Linda M. Keller, Symposium Article,
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Evolution and
(non)Implementation Worldwide, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 35 (2004).
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must first invite the cooperation of a subject State and that State must consent to
any visit.42 These and other procedures hamper CEDAW’s efficacy.43
While the Protocol attempts to improve the CEDAW’s ineffectiveness, it
still fails to enforce the Convention.44 To begin with, fewer than half of the
member States have ratified it. In addition, although refusing reservations,45 State
parties can opt out of the inquiry procedure,46 a provision enhanced by CEDAW’s
Article 10, which allows States to disregard CEDAW’s competence to investigate
complaints and to make recommendations.47 Further evidence of the Protocol’s
limited utility lies in the fact that since its inception, the CEDAW Committee has
decided just ten cases. Of the ten, in those where the Committee made a decision
on the merits and found in favor of the claimant, the relief was limited to broadbased recommendations.48 Despite the presence of the Protocol, CEDAW has no
sanctioning power. Even if it were permitted to investigate alleged violations, it
could not force state compliance.49
Like many human rights endeavors, CEDAW is clearly soft law in that it
fails to delegate power to the international institution.50 Soft law eases enactment,
42

See Keller, supra note 41, at 38.
Another argument for CEDAW’s ineffectiveness is its vague phrasing of the goals State Parties
must accomplish to meet their affirmative Convention obligations. See Arnold, supra note 36, at
1392-93. Critics assert that the language (such as Article 2’s requirement that State Parties act “by
all appropriate means and without delay” and “agree to pursue”) used in the Convention
concerning State Parties’ obligations is vague and unclear. Id. The use of this terminology allows
State Parties to avoid compliance with the obligations imposed by the Convention. State Parties
could claim that the determination of “appropriate means” should be left to the States themselves
and each State should independently determine what is appropriate. See id. at 1343, 1392-93.
Thus, States that do not comply with the Convention’s affirmative duties could escape sanctions
by claiming that they have taken the measures that they deemed necessary to fulfill their
obligations under the Convention.
44
See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 678; see also Ritz, supra note 23, at 208-09.
45
See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 678.
46
See id.; see also Ritz, supra note 23, at 209-10.
47
See Riddle, supra note 23, at 634.
48
In the case of Ms. A.S. v. Hungary, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Communication No. 4/2004,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004, 3.3 (2006), the complainant alleged that before performing an
emergency cesarean section to remove the complainant’s dead fetus, state doctors effectively
coerced her into signing a consent form that gave her doctors permission to tie her fallopian tubes,
resulting in sterilization. The committee found that the complainant’s rights had been violated and
recommended that Hungary take further measures to ensure that the relevant provisions of the
Convention be enforced, including reviewing domestic legislation and monitoring health centers.
See id. at 18.
49
See Ritz, supra note 23, at 191, 210-14.
50
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 37, 58 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001). According to
Abbot and Snidal, soft law:
[P]rovides a rational adaptation to uncertainty. It allows states to capture the
“easy” gains they can recognize with incomplete knowledge, without allowing
differences or uncertainties about the situation to impede completion of the
bargain… Soft law avoids the sovereignty costs associated with centralized
adjudication or other strong delegation and is less costly than repeated
43
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as states do not actually cede enforcement power.51 It mitigates the concerns
states have by allowing reservations, escape clauses, imprecise commitments, and
forms of delegation, which, in turn, accord member States future control if
adverse circumstances arise.52 States can apprehend the consequences of their
agreement prior to making it a hard law⎯binding, precise and delegated
enforcement.53 Although CEDAW and the Optional Protocol require State
members to implement general guidelines to end gender discrimination, they both
set forth principles rather than rules, making the Convention a soft law.54
CEDAW and the Optional Protocol fail to provide precise legal obligations and
do not require compliance or responsibility by parties.55
Finally, the
Convention’s soft interstate and reporting procedures do not penalize state noncompliance.56
Perhaps CEDAW’s principal limitation is the reservations it permits,57 a
factor that reflects human rights norms more than the shortcomings of CEDAW
itself. CEDAW has been ratified with reservations by more states than almost any
other human rights treaty to date.58 Many reservations draw on assertions of
renegotiation in light of new information . . . ; [it] allows states to adopt their
commitments to their particular situation rather than trying to accommodate the
divergent national circumstances within a single text . . . ; [it] accommodates
states with different degrees of readiness for legalization [and] . . . ; facilitates
compromise between weak and powerful states.
Id. at 60.
In contrast to “soft law”, the term “hard law” has been defined as legally binding
obligations that are precise and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.
The advantages of choosing hard law include reduction of transactional costs, strengthening the
credibility of the commitments of State Parties, expanding State Parties’ available political
strategies, and resolving problems of incomplete contracting. Hard law is generally reserved for
issues that require assurance devices when the benefits of cooperation are great but the potential
for opportunism and its costs are high, require high credibility of commitments when
noncompliance is difficult to detect, and need to be resolved on national as well as an international
level. Id. at 38, 45-46.
51
It also offers more effective ways to deal with uncertainties and “facilitates
compromise⎯mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different interests and values,
different time horizons and discount rates, and different degrees of power.” Id. at 38-39. Soft law
is utilized when member States recognize a given issue but are concerned about their sovereignty
and the costs and risks of entering an agreement. Id. at 50-51.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 51.
54
See Ritz, supra note 23, at 191, 214-15.
55
See id. at 215.
56
See id. The Optional Protocol, which was aimed at strengthening the enforcement procedures of
CEDAW, facilitates but does not enforce compliance. See id.
57
See Martinez, supra note 23, at 175.
58
See Riddle, supra note 23, at 605. “Of the United Nations’ human rights treaties, CEDAW has
attracted the greatest number of reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not
all, of the terms of the treaty.” Id. at 606 Article 28 of the Convention, permits ratification of the
Convention provided that the reservations are not “incompatible with the object and purpose of the
present Convention.” See The Women’s Convention, supra note 25, at 688. The Convention,
however, provides no mechanism to determine whether a given reservation violates the terms of
Article 28. In addition, the Convention fails to provide CEDAW with the authority to evaluate or
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cultural or religious beliefs, some sweeping.59 For example, Saudi Arabia
attached a general reservation to the treaty, stating that: “In case of contradiction
between any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom
is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention.”60
Libya made a similar reservation, providing that CEDAW cannot conflict with
Islamic laws having to do with “personal status derived from the Islamic
Shari’a.”61 Countries like Egypt, Bangladesh, India and Iraq have made
comparable reservations.62 These examples illustrate the tension between the
principles of nondiscrimination and freedom of belief.63 CEDAW’s critics argue
that these extensive reservations undermine the object and purpose of the
Convention, reducing it to a symbolic commitment.64 Yet many argue that
without this reservation process, CEDAW would have far fewer signatories.65
Although CEDAW reflects some acknowledgement by the world
community that women’s rights matter, its shortcomings reflect a serious flaw in
this recognition. Reservations point to resistance to changing sexist cultural and
religious norms. The Convention provides a first step but not a workable
solution, suggested by the fact that over forty-five countries around the
world⎯most of which have ratified or acceded to CEDAW⎯maintain laws that
explicitly discriminate against women.66
As an international law text, CEDAW’s efficacy is limited. But in
informal ways, the Convention has aided activists in enforcing international
norms and required states to attend, at least somewhat, to CEDAW’s norms.
Considering how limited CEDAW’s “hard” legal influence is, some find debates
over “soft” law, particularly with regard to CEDAW, to be simply irrelevant.67
Within nations, laws related to the issues raised by the Convention are quite
“hard” indeed: domestic laws that affect women vary from State to State and
impact real lives.68 Depending on one’s sex, nationality determines when and
whom one can marry, whether one can divorce, control one’s reproduction, own
limit reservations that violate Article 28, and there are no procedural limitations on making
reservations. Thus, as of 2002, fifty-five States filed reservations, and another fourteen States
initially entered reservations but subsequently withdrew them. See id.
59
See Keller, supra note 41, at 39.
60
Id.
61
See Riddle, supra note 23, at 627.
62
See id.
63
See id. Saudi Arabia, like many other countries, is not prepared to sacrifice its citizens’ religion
and beliefs to enforce CEDAW. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia acceded to CEDAW only because
CEDAW was a soft law that contains general, dimly enforceable, principles rather than precise
legally binding and enforceable obligations. See id.
64
See id.; see also Martinez, supra note 23, at 175; Ernst, supra note 23, at 299, 337-40; Ritz,
supra note 23, at 191, 207-08; Riddle, supra note 23, at 627.
65
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 2006-10 (2002) (analyzing the correlation between compliance requirements and ratification
of international human rights treaties).
66
See Ritz, supra note 23, at 200.
67
See Abbott and Snidal, supra note 50, at 38.
68
Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 825.
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or inherit property, and even whether one can vote or run for office.69 Most
CEDAW signatories enforce straightforward rules on such questions, often
manifesting deep gender inequalities.70
CEDAW’s failures do not mean the treaty is useless—far from it. The
Convention’s provisions inspire a range of reactions from fully compliant
internalization to disdainful evasion.71 The fact that CEDAW may not obligate
compliance does not mean that it has failed—countries do internalize international
norms that arise in CEDAW. However, they do so in different ways, as in
Brazilian and French compliance with CEDAW provisions for political
representation.72 The iteration of international norms in domestic contexts draws
on comparative legal understanding. For example, international law can
encourage internalization through transnational networks of activists and
individuals73 and through acculturation and selective adaptation.74
Cultural differences surface within and across national boundaries, leading
State and non-State actors to engage in political behavior based on multiple
rationalities. Although some internationalists75 may worry that cultural relativism
challenges the viability of their universal norms, in Internalizing Gender, I argued
that international norms were adopted, albeit colored with local cultural realities.76
The importance of culture and local factors does not demonstrate the irrelevance
of international norms. Although cultural differences may distract observers from
the influence of international norms, internalization occurs in the adoption of
domestic law that reflects CEDAW’s broad goals. International norms fragment
and, to some extent, lose their universality, as domestic constructs borrow from
and interact with international norms, yielding a syncretic internalization.77
In short, despite the profound challenges that face the enforcement of
CEDAW’s norms and the general weakness of its structure, CEDAW can and
does influence national behavior. Central to its cross-cultural appeal and its
profound limitations is its core subject, women. Considering the many ways in
which CEDAW’s focus on women restricts the Convention’s potential, attention
to the meaning of “sex” or “gender” would bring states into an explicit
consideration of the potentially broader constituencies for a treaty that moves
beyond the suffering of one narrowly-defined group.

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 787-800.
73
See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1-10 (1998).
74
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004); see also Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender,
supra note 10, at 824-25.
75
See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997).
76
Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 759, 821-25.
77
Id. at 824.
70
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II.

CEDAW Should Not Focus Solely on Women

CEDAW errs in placing “women” at the center of the Convention. The
meaning of “women” holds a clear appeal—its universality and biologicallydriven clarity make it the apparently optimal focus for an international treaty
reaching toward legitimacy in a wide range of cultures. This Part will postulate a
reason for the use of “women” at the heart of CEDAW. It will then show that
“women” confronts many shortcomings that undermine CEDAW’s own equality
norms, both theoretical and strategic. “Women” is at the core of a positivist,
identity-driven construction that reflects what Janet Halley calls “Feminist
Universalism.”78 Finally, although some scholars, notably Catharine MacKinnon
and Martha Fineman, have attempted to reformulate the use of the term “women”
in a broader fashion, these efforts fail to achieve the desired goal of making
“women” a term that reflects the full panoply of sex and gender related issues.
A.

The Purpose of “Women”

CEDAW’s women-centered approach initially served the goal of
recognizing women as proper subjects of human rights and that human rights
norms excluded many issues that affect women. When drafted, CEDAW needed
to focus on women and their experiences to define the harms of sexism.
However, while CEDAW contains many definitions, at no point does it attempt to
define its central subject. What did “women” mean in the 1970’s as CEDAW
took shape?79 In its silence, drafters at least partly relied on popular, rather than
legal, definitions. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “women” as the
plural of “woman”:
1 An adult female human; 2: Women considered as a group;
womenkind; 3: An adult female human belonging to a
78

See Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2008) [hereinafter
Halley, Rape at Rome].
79
The first wave of feminism was characterized by nineteenth century advocacy for women’s
rights, primarily concerning attaining suffrage. Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave
Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 99, 101 (2007). The second wave of the 1960’s and 70’s sought more political
recognition of the rights and power of women as a group and was signified by a rejection of
traditional gender roles and femininity. Id. The second wave was followed by the third wave in
early 1990’s. Id. at 107. “If first- and second-wave feminism sought an accretion of rights and
power to women as a group, third-wave feminism seeks recognition for the individual. Id. at 11718. “To date, third-wave feminist writing has focused primarily on non-legal (and non-theoretical)
aspects of female sexuality, economic mobility and the multi-faceted nature of racial, ethnic, class
and gender identities. Third-wave feminist writers also acknowledge and emphasize the role of
culture, media and technology in shaping those identities. These writers tend to take a broad view
of ‘women’s issues’ by connecting traditional feminist concerns such as reproductive freedom and
discrimination in employment with broader justice movements for workers, immigrants, gays and
lesbians and other disadvantaged groups.” Id. at 102.
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specified occupation, group, nationality, or other category; 4:
Feminine quality or aspect, womanliness; 5: A female servant
or subordinate; 6: Informal a. A wife. b. A female lover or
sweetheart.80
This definition serves to answer the quandary of why “women” did not require
definition: it references a biological category (“female”) that is also a universal
one (“womankind”). As with most silences, CEDAW’s non-definition of
“women” reveals more than any definition it contains. It conveys a simultaneous
presumption of universality. “Women” was viewed as a universal term that
conveyed an obvious meaning to most people in most cultures.
Step back for a moment. At the time of CEDAW’s drafting, the term
“women” had not yet been interrogated as a contested term. The drafters simply
used the term without contemplating that it might limit the efficacy of the
Convention. In the 1970’s, women’s rights activists asserted that international
law needed to focus on women and their experiences and to define the harms of
sexism.81 CEDAW reflected an “up with women” answer to crucial international
law questions.82 Political movements and academic scholarship from the 1970’s
concentrated on promoting women’s empowerment⎯“Sisterhood is Powerful.”83
Women’s studies were just beginning to take root, as Title VII jurisprudence first
explored the meaning of sex discrimination.84 Proto-movement “transsexualism”
did not yet yield any women’s movement introspection, as tensions between
lesbian feminists and drag queens tore apart the lesbian and gay movement.85 At
that time, universalist notions of sisterhood overpowered even the hint of gender’s
cultural contingency, which only began to shake the core of transnational
feminism with the 1990’s controversies over female genital cutting.86
80

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1595 (4th ed. 2000).
Crawford, supra note 79, at 101.
82
Id.
83
ROBIN MORGAN, SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL (Vintage 1970).
84
See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the U.S. military from treating service men and women
differently when they claim their spouse as a dependant); Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(declaring an Idaho statute which required that men must be preferred to women in selecting the
administrator of an estate when both candidates are similarly qualified as violative of the the Equal
Protection clause of the 14th Amendement).
85
This tension dates to early in the gay rights movement. During the 1973 Pride March in
Washington Square Park in New York City, radical lesbian activist Jean O’Leary and the drag
queens in attendance engaged in a dispute, in part over whether the transvestites’ overly feminine
dress mocked women. Only the performance by Bette Midler of “You’ve Got to Have Friends”
soothed tensions. STEPHAN L. COHEN, THE GAY LIBERATION YOUTH MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK
169 (2008).
86
That controversy divided “Western” feminists, who decried the practice, from other feminists,
including African and Middle Eastern feminists, who objected to the colonial tone of such
reproaches. Western feminist efforts to eradicate FGC may have led to nationalist responses in
certain contexts. Whereas the practice of FGC had been waning, once international actors entered
national contexts to oppose it, FGC became a newly valued part of tribal or national tradition, a
practice worth maintaining. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Between Irua and “Female Genital
81
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Few attempts have been made at a socio-legal history of CEDAW’s
drafting, but based on the period of the drafting and the actors involved, we can
interpret the role “women” played. When drafted, CEDAW needed to focus on
women and their experiences to define and address the harms of sexism. In the
1970’s, the Convention sought to ensure women a place at the international law
table, thereby serving the key second wave feminist goal of recognizing women
as proper subjects of human rights.87 Yet, this focus also served broader
legitimizing purposes for the nascent international feminist movement. The
creation of what was until recently the most widely-subscribed international treaty
involved the elaboration and exercise of political power at national and
international levels. CEDAW’s drafters legitimized the treaty through the
adoption of a universally understood identity such as “women.” The role of the
identity “women” in this enterprise merits attention at this time when the lack of
descriptive or critical analysis has become apparent.
Knowing the complexity of the term “women,” we may also explain
CEDAW’s non-definition of women as purposeful vagueness.88 Parties to a
contract gloss over differences through the use of vague language to conclude a
deal.89 Likewise, drafters of international treaties avoid contested language that
may undermine widespread ratification. That vagueness served a political
purpose, unifying State parties that may disagree on a definition. The use of the
term “women” avoids the minefields of possible alternatives. Defining women
would raise debates such as those that arose concerning the use of “gender” in the
Rome Statute.90
American Heritage’s popular definition of “women” deepens the suspicion
that the use of the term “women” in the Convention helps construct “women” as
men’s victims. A “woman” colloquially means a servant or attendant, or
(presumably a man’s) wife, girlfriend or mistress.91 By virtue of the seemingly
harmless universalist and biological meaning, the sotto voce definition involving
submission and subservience takes root. Perhaps CEDAW’s silence in defining
women furthered the goal of widespread ratification, but it was at the cost of
reifying popular, and implicitly sexist, understandings of “women.”
Mutilation”: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1
(1995); see also Eugenie Anne Gifford, “The Courage of Blaspheme”: Confronting Barriers to
Resisting Female Genital Mutilation, 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 329 (1994); Leslye Amede
Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against
Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1997); Isabelle R. Gunning, Uneasy
Alliances and Solid Sisterhood: A Response to Professor Obiora’s Bridges and Barricades, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445 (1997).
87
See Beijing Conference, supra note 1.
88
The relative paucity of historical documents relating to the drafting of CEDAW obscures
whether the drafters considered the meaning of the term “women.”
89
See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389 (2004).
90
See generally Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice, 18
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55 (2005).
91
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 1978.
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“Women” served a clear purpose in the positivist legal project of
international women’s rights. Using Abbott and Snidal’s definition, international
law derives legitimacy from three elements of the relationship between states and
international bodies: obligation, precision, and delegation.92 By each of these
measures, the term “women” plays a crucial role. CEDAW’s reliance on the term
created the conditions for states to sign the CEDAW treaty. The neutrality, and
indeed the universality, of the term created the conditions for State Parties to bind
themselves to an international treaty that obligated them to report the status of
women to the CEDAW Committee.93 The biological specificity of “women”
served as the central category around which states could enter into precise
agreements. Finally, although CEDAW, as a largely soft law, involves little
delegation,94 the delegation by states to the international body also presupposes
the use of an uncontested term that would serve as the subject of the Convention.
Thanks to the use of the term “women,” signatories apprehended the meaning of
their agreement with regard to the obligation, precision and delegation.95 The use
of the term both legitimized and narrowed international remedies. It served as an
organizing concept around which this positivist project could arise.
CEDAW, to the extent it has succeeded, depends on “women,” both as a
concept and as a group. Yet “women” as a group of people have played a central
role as actors working toward the limited successes of the project. International
women’s rights activists have dedicated their energies, and some their lives,
toward achieving the Convention’s legitimacy.96 It is for understandable political
reasons then that such feminists hesitate to explore the costs of the identitycentered deployment of “women.” Nonetheless, an honest assessment of the costs
and benefits of both the choice by CEDAW’s drafters to place “women” at the
center of their arguments and subsequent compliance by feminist engagements
may help us recognize the limitations that result from these political choices.
B.

The False Universals and Certainties of “Women”

The term “women” created a cross-cultural site to resist fragmentation by
other identity traits, such as nationality, class, race and religion.97 Women’s
power both within nation states and in international law has only recently
92

See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 38; see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard
and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424 (2000).
93
New and complex agreements create uncertainty over the possible consequences of a legalized
arrangement. To alleviate concerns over uncertainty, actors often prefer imprecise language rather
than face unfavorable commitments. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 57-58.
94
Id. at 54.
95
See generally id.
96
See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women’s NGOs in the
Enforcement of the Women’s Convention, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 129 (1999) (analyzing the impact of
NGOs in enforcing CEDAW in Bangladesh).
97
Dianne Otto, Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of
International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 105,
106 (Doris Buss & Abreena Manji eds., 2005).
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garnered some currency. At least part of the legitimacy of international feminist
efforts relies on the “almost contradictory idea of international feminism that all
violence against women all over the world is the same.”98 Fear of the
fragmentation of this identity motivates continued reinvestment in the term.
CEDAW’s identity-based model presaged subsequent women’s rights efforts that
rely on identity for international law protection.99
Two areas of inquiry prove useful in elaborating the shortcomings of this
unitary rhetoric: critical race feminism and comparative law-based critiques.
Critical race feminists and other anti-essentialists have questioned the utility of a
unified, universal concept of a group called women.100 Black feminists in
particular target the term “women” as a reference to white women.102
My work has selected various remedies for inequality and explored their
meaning in light of vastly different understandings of constitutional norms.101 I
export this critical framework to an area of international law that has been the
subject of much debate, but little of it in the fundamental question of the
formative uses of identity. Comparative research reveals equally trenchant flaws
in a universalist conception of “women.” The meaning of “women” varies from
country to country.102 Biological commonalities may exist among women in
different countries, but the experience of women varies not only along national
and cultural lines, but also especially along class lines.103 Work and family roles
vary along each of these axes, leading to vast disparities that undermine the

98

Lama Abu Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The “Honor” of the “East” and the “Passion” of
the “West,” 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287, 290 (1997).
99
Otto, supra note 97, at 105-06.
100
See generally Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003).See BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A
WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 1-13, 119-58 (1981); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and the Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241 (1991) (Focusing on the multiple dimensions of identity and how the experiences of
black women, which are rarely represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism,
are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Gender, Race, And The Politics Of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import Of The Anita
Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, Anita Hill, Remarks Before The National Forum For Women
State Legislators, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 1467, 1567-68 (1992) (“African-American women by virtue
of our race and gender are situated within at least two systems of subordination: racism and
sexism. . . . [T]he dynamics of racism and sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that
are sometimes unique to us.”); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal
Theory Out of Coalition, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER 73-77
(Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003) (recognizing overlapping identities of race and
gender and discussing how working in a coalition can be most advantageous instead of pretending
overlaps don’t exist).
101

See Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance, supra note 16.
Sex, referring to biological difference, may vary minimally from country to country. Gender, in
contrast, depends on culture and varies substantially across borders. Rosenblum, Internalizing
Gender, supra note 10, at 801 (citing Katherine Frank, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995)).
103
Id. at 804.
102
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concept of a universal “woman.”104 Socioeconomic factors construct the
relationship between women and society, both in its public and private
iterations.105 Family structures could consign women to the home or encourage
them to work, perhaps even abroad.106 Reproductive policy, daycare, public
education and healthcare each shift the nature of the identity of “women.”107
Each of these socioeconomic factors define the power relationship
between men and women in different societies. Even the biological unity of
“women” varies depending on the practice and availability of sex-related surgery,
whether for ritual modification, cosmetic purposes or gender identity-related
surgery.108 CEDAW’s universalist language does not account for the impact of
this contingency on international human rights law. Those who work with
CEDAW may wish to avoid such contingency, fearing that it “softens” the
already “soft” legal concepts in international women’s human rights law.109
Such anti-essentialist arguments surface in comparative work on gender
identity that reveals the extent to which universal norms ignore gender's cultural
construction.
Thai and Indian gender identities, as Sonia Katyal has
demonstrated, incorporate both sharply divergent gender and sexual identities.110
Larry Catá Backer has contrasted the constructions of gender and sexuality in
Malaysia, Zimbabwe and the United States.111 And with regard to the issue of the
wearing of the veil, several scholars have weighed in on the impact of cultural
difference: Karima Bennoune,112 Mary Anne Case,113 Joan Wallach Scott,114
Madhavi Sunder115 and Adrien Wing,116 to name a few. These cultural
explorations of gender differentials reflect the dynamic relationship among
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Id.
Id.
106
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP
104-12 (2006).
107
Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 804.
108
Id. at 801.
109
HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 66 (2000).
110
Sonia Kaytal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMININISM 97, 136-41, 152-67 (2002).
111
Larry Catá Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, Zimbabwe and
Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (2007) [hereinafter Backer, Emasculated Men].
112
Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves,
Religious Expression, and Women's Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 367 (2007).
113
Mary Anne Case, On Feminist Fundamentalism, in CHILDREN IN THE DISCOURSES OF RELIGION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming).
114
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007).
115
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1398 (2003).
116
Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim
Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743 (2006).
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identities of sex, gender, and sexuality.117 Cosmopolitan arguments contribute to
understanding the complexity of identity categories such as “women.”118
In a previous article, I argued that CEDAW faces a particularly
challenging barrier in the translation of a universal conception into different
nations' sharply conflicting legal cultures.119 Differentiation among legal cultures
may lead to divergent internalizations of the same international norm.120 One of
the Convention’s weaknesses has been the underlying inability of states to agree
to specific enforceable remedies for gender inequality.121 In that article, I showed
how the differences between Brazilian and French gender constructions played
out in remedies adopted pursuant to CEDAW.122 There, I argued that an
awareness of difference created possibilities for new and different universals,
based on a broader understanding of cultural realities rather than simple
projections of a particular culture onto the world political stage.123 Here, I go one
step further: the centrality of the imprecise term “women” pretends to attain
universality while inhibiting cultural variation.
Indeed, CEDAW may be viewed as proto-“Governance Feminism,” a term
Janet Halley and others use to describe feminist efforts at occupying key positions
in public regulatory efforts.124 The term was coined to describe the efforts of
feminists responding to sex trafficking.125 Subsequently, Halley has used this
117

Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV.
11 (1995).
118
Cosmopolitanism, a mingling of normative values throughout the world, revived first by
Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES 93-119 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995), and then in a different vein by KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006), and by Paul
Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007).
119
Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 807.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See generally id.
123
Id. at 801. Comparative techniques elucidate the potential for integrating comparative and
international legal scholarship. The comparative scholar will examine the construction and culture
of international law, necessarily revealing its biases. Here, the political goals of CEDAW presume
sociopolitical structures of firmly rooted democracies. The terminology of “sex” and “gender”
ignores the potential for variation of gender across cultures. In certain countries, gender means the
divide between men and women, while in others it may mean the fluidity of such identities, or
even the ability to choose sex or marital partners without regard to gender. Comparative work
reveals such cultural variations and their legal import. Id. at 807.
124
See Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note 78, at 6.
125
Gfeminists achieved success internationally through their efforts which led to the drafting of
the 2000 United Nations “Protocol on Trafficking” as well as domestically when, during that same
year, the United States congress passed the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act.”
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
25, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001);
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 106, 114 Stat.
1464 (2000). Both of these achievements had reverbatory effects on other national stages. See
Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the
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concept to criticize the feminist interventions in international criminal law that
sought absolute reform and abolition of the practices used in what these feminists
saw as a “global war against women.”126
Halley calls this structuralist feminist agenda “Feminist Universalism,” in
which women, known as GFeminists, exist not as a “particular group of
humanity” but rather as their own universe.127 Assuming that women’s position
as victim is ubiquitous, the Feminist Universalism vision seeks reforms far
broader than those engaged in by the early Gfeminists’ efforts to shape
international criminal law.128 Halley explains that these early battles were
relatively minor and that the feminist consensus was actually after something
“more elusive, more structural.”129 The goal was to change “the very
classificatory scheme of universal justice.”130 The Geneva Conventions provided
a structure whereby the well being of women was part of an effort to maintain a
“universal human integrity.”131 As Halley reveals, the Feminist Universalists
believe that “the right of women to be secure from sexual assault was itself
fundamental, central, and of universal scope,” and that female suffering exists
separately from that of a male.132 Feminist Universalists went further, arguing
that they needed to address the gendered social constructs that bolster male
domination.133
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335, 348 (2006).
126
See Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note 78, at 2.
127
Id. at 7. Feminist Universalism reflects some inspiration from Luce Irirgaray, the French
feminist philosopher. LUCE IRIGRARY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (Catherine Porter trans.,
Cornell University Press 1985) (1977). Feminists have long debated theories of difference. Since
the 1970’s, French feminist theory, led by Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray, has
delved into issues of women's difference from men. Of the three, Irigaray developed the most
explicitly political examination of women's position in society. In that sense, although no
particular philosopher or political theorist has dominated the debate on Parity in France, Irigaray's
philosophy most closely approaches the theories espoused by the Parity movement. Early on, her
philosophy emphasized the fundamental difference between women and men. One of her most
well known works, This Sex Which Is Not One, explored the social meaning of women's
biological difference from men. As men are unitary, women are multiple, Irigaray argued, even
down to their genitalia. Id. at 23. Women's multiplicity puts them in the social position of focusing
on relational behavior. Irigaray explored how women's language expressed this relationshipcentered existence, in which women constantly relate to others, consistently referring to their
interlocutors. With regard to women's political role in society, Irigaray has argued that women, as
metaphysically distinct from men, have the right to citizenship which reflects their own existence.
See Luce Irigaray, L'Identite Feminine: Biologie ou Conditionnement Social?, in FEMMES: MOITIE
DE LA TERRE MOITIE DU POUVOIR 101 (Gisele Halimi ed., 1994). A certain number of French
feminists disagreed with this “difference” theory, espousing instead the theory that women have
the right to “equal” treatment. GILL ALLWOOD & KHURSHEED WADIA, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN
FRANCE 1958-2000, 218-19 (2000).
128
See Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note 78, at 60.
129
Id. at 59.
130
Id. at 61-62.
131
Id. at 62.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 83.
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Halley dismisses Feminist Universalism, referring to it, shamelessly, as
“FU.”134 Halley in particular criticizes the effort to link the everyday war against
women, and all sexual violence, to war crimes. She points out the lack of a
plausible “connection to armed conflict.”135
Feminist Universalism is the heir to two elements of CEDAW: its soft law
core, as delineated in Part I, and its construction around “women.” It is because
the Convention does not succeed at establishing hard international law that the
communities that advocated for CEDAW’s expansion have shifted their
arguments to rely on criminalization.136 Criminalization provides an opportunity
for feminists to attain hard law results for some of the core concerns that first
arose in response to CEDAW.137 This historical connection lead advocates to
search for a more fruitful link between international law and violence against
women.138 Feminist Universalism also draws on the same brand of thinking about
gender as CEDAW: “women” play a central role, and the broader issues of
gender, and indeed of men’s role in gender, are at worst invisible or at best
secondary. Without the victim-centered subjectivity of women, Feminist
Universalism would have no core meaning.
1.

“Women” is not a Discrete Category

134

Halley writes: “unless you are a radical feminist, seeing it that way will take an effort of
sympathetic imagination. If you can do it, you have entered into the consciousness of the FU.” Id.
at 83. FU goes further. Once the Balkan conflict is “untethered” from its ethnic dimensions it
becomes part of the everyday war against women and if “every rape is an expression of male
domination” then for Copelon all rape should be within the scope of international criminal law. Id.
at 64. The feminists efforts in extending the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC to peace time
failed as the Rome Statute has express provisions limiting its reach to armed conflicts. Id. at 112.
However, the ICC does classify persecution on the basis of gender alone as a crime against
humanity and so the very framing of ethno-nationalist conflicts that Halley detests is now an
available tool for a prosecutor in the ICC. Id. at 108. Halley expresses concern that this success is
inattentive to “the possibility that women have been the instigators or perpetrators of conflict” and
also that it permits a “chilling indifference to the suffering and death of men.” Id. at 123.
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Id. at 84.
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It is worth noting, though, that CEDAW does not directly address violence against women.
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Andrea Vesa argues that Article I of the CEDAW defines discrimination to include violence
that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.
See Andreea Vesa, International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of Domestic
Violence, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L 309, 327 (2004) (citing Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Violence Against Women: CEDAW General Recommendations
No. 19, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992)). Article 5(a) compels states “to modify the social and
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CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 5(a)). Susan Feanne Toepfer notes that CEDAW’s preamble
establishes that its framers considered trafficking in women to be sex discrimination, and that
CEDAW’s purpose was to prohibit these activities. Susan Feanne Toepfer, The Worldwide Market
for Sex: A Review of International and Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding Trafficking in
Women, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L 83, 101-02 (1994).
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Framing CEDAW around “women” reinforces the binary between men
and women in human rights and fails to serve as a universal descriptor. Its
meaning, as part of a binary with men, lacks certainty.139 Although I have made
this argument elsewhere,140 it is a crucial point that requires brief attention. The
term “women” itself presumes a binary that essentializes gender. One’s gender
identity may defy simple categorization due to biology141 or by intent to change
identity.142 A clear divide between “men” and “women” does not exist.143
Although most people accept that there are only "male" and "female" sexes, each
category involves a myriad of genders formed genetically, biologically and
culturally.144 "Each of the so-called criteria of sexedness is itself a continuum—
including chromosomal variables, genital and gonadal variations, reproductive
capacities, [and] endocrinological proportions."145 Scientists generally agree that
there are seven gender traits that constitute one's gender identity: 1)
chromosomes; 2) gonads; 3) hormones; 4) internal reproductive organs; 5)
external genitalia; 6) secondary sexual characteristics; and 7) self identity.146
These seven variables classify the distinct elements of gender identity.
As I have argued elsewhere, beyond transgender individuals’ lives, the
gender binary wreaks multiple nefarious effects on public policy.147 The ubiquity
of the categories "male" and "female" cannot prove its veracity as the irreducible
essence of gender. Such categories truncate the diversity of gender identity.148
139

See Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the
Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000) [hereinafter Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing
Sing].
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See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the
Selective Condemnation of ‘Cultural Practices’, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71 (2005)
(discussing the plight of intersex individuals and comparing legal arguments regarding corrective
surgery for intersex people to those made related to female genital cutting).
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Many transgender people transition from one gender to another, with or without medical
assistance, without the purpose of “passing” as the other gender. See generally KATE BORNSTEIN,
GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US 65–69 (1994).
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AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 1595 (defining sex as “either of the two
divisions, designated female and male, of this classification”).
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See Ann Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not Enough, THE
SCIENCES, Mar./Apr. 1993 at 20-21; see also Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing, supra note 139,
at 503.
145
JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN 28 (Plume 1989).
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See Douglas K. Smith, Transexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 963, 972 (1971); See also Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing, supra note 139, at 504.
Fifteen years later, the New York Supreme Court of New York County used the exact formulation
cited above in Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding
that a pre-operative transgendered female was protected by New York City’s sex discrimination
statute as a member of the class of males).
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See generally Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing, supra note 139; see also David B. Cruz,
Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (1992).
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This Article will not directly address the relevance of my theory of gender binarism to feminist
theory. Rather, the multiplicity of gender conforms quite closely to what I interpret as the spirit of
contemporary anti-essentialist feminist theory. See Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical
Gender Theory: The possibility of a Restroom Labeled “Other”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1997).
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The psychological component of "self identity" renders the simple male/female
dichotomy useless, leaving the categories "male" and "female," and indeed “men”
and “women,” wanting.149
The contemporary evolution of medical technology, combined with the
increasingly commonplace transgender identity, has blurred the lines between
“men” and “women.” Widespread medical testing of gender for the Beijing
Olympics exposes the open-ended nature of sex definition.150 As has been widely
reported, the diversity of physical gender has led to the testing of each Olympic
athlete to ascertain his or her gender.151 More recently, one official defended
gender testing of a runner in international competition because of “ambiguity, not
because we believe she is cheating.”152 Given the indefinite nature of the term
“women,” it is not a useful descriptor of a group subject to the protection of
international law. “Women,” a term adopted for its clear biological reference,
turns out not to be as clear as was widely thought. Its lack of precision,
highlighted by the multiplicity of biological components in sex identity, is blurred
still further by contemporary medical technology. But “women” not only fails to
convey the specific group intended by CEDAW’s drafters, it undermines the
Convention’s efficacy.
2.

This Male/Female Binary Debilitates CEDAW

Beyond this literal deconstruction of the biological meaning of the term
“women,” the actual deployment of the term “women” in women’s rights
discourse exposes multiple socio-political meanings for the term “women.” As
Dianne Otto argues, the emphasis on certain “female subjectivities” establishes
the “otherness” of women in women’s rights discourse.153 Otto identifies three
“female subjectivities” reproduced by human rights discourse,154 each of which is
marginalized by a corresponding masculine subject.155 First, the wife and mother
requires protection and “is more an object than a subject of international law.”156
Men, as heads of households, form the masculine component of this binary.157
The second subjectivity is the “formally equal” woman, whose role in public life
is measured by the extent to which it matches the implicit “masculine standard of
‘equality’ against which her claims to equality are assessed . . . .”158 This equality
strategy presumes as normative the masculine standard, thereby fostering a
149
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B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/sports/20runner.html?_r=1&th&emc=th.
153
Otto, supra note 97, at 106.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
150

21

UNSEX CEDAW
©Darren Rosenblum
Do not quote, cite or circulate without permission.

harmful binary that places women in the inferior position.159 Third is the female
victim “produced by colonial narratives of gender” and the perceived “sexual
vulnerability” of women.160 The male homologue for this subjectivity is the
masculine bearer of “‘civilization’ and savior of ‘good’ women from ‘bad‘ often
‘native,’ men.”161
Each of these opposing visions of the masculine and feminine “organizes
sex/gender as a hierarchy, with the masculine assuming the position of
authority.”162 These constructions of women’s subjectivities reflect a pre-third
wave feminist perspective that ignores the centrality of agency to contemporary
understandings of gender.163 Otto ultimately concludes that to dismantle the
hierarchical binary of gender, gender must be reconceived as fluid and formulated
as a hybrid.164
In reproducing these hierarchical binaries, CEDAW’s potential for
transforming women’s lives is compromised.165 Most of the CEDAW provisions
follow a formal equality yardstick, measuring success as the extent to which men
have access to a particular social position.166 The imprecision of the term
“women” becomes clearer once we consider the different contexts in which
“women” exist—they are wives and mothers, persons equal to men, and victims.
Each of these subjectivities arouses a legal response within CEDAW. Most
important is the extent to which the Convention renders invisible the individuals
identified as women but do not fit into these three subjectivities. I will address
this directly later in my argument—the point now is to demonstrate that beyond
the biological uncertainty of the term “women” lies a crucial socio-political
imprecision.
C.

Attempts to Re-define Women Achieve Only Partial Success

Feminist legal scholars and activists have not entirely missed the
shortcomings of the term “women.” Many (although certainly not all) have
attended to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer thinking about the
complex relationship among identity, gender and sexuality.167 One response by
feminists has been to redefine “women” in a broader sense that recognizes such
159
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See generally Crawford, supra note 79; see also Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)contents:
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Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 (2002)
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theoretical developments. Here, I will focus on two responses, those of Catharine
MacKinnon and, more recently, of Martha Fineman.168 These responses do an
admirable job of expanding and updating the category of “women.” However,
although effective arguments in a sense, they do not remedy the central
shortcoming of the term “women” as I argue it here.
MacKinnon has recognized the fact that men may deserve the protections
from sexist power that she originally prescribed for women.169 In MacKinnon’s
work, the alternating explicit and implicit subordination of women has played a
driving role.170 Two instances of this intervention surface: her argument in the
Canadian Supreme Court’s consideration of pornography restrictions171 and her
argument in the Oncale same-sex sexual harassment case before the U.S.
Supreme Court.172
Generally, MacKinnon focuses on sexuality as the central source of
women’s oppression.173 MacKinnon’s view is that all women experience
oppression at the hands of patriarchal power in the form of “male laws.”174
Critics have pointed out her reluctance to recognize the multiplicity of women’s
experiences, including social, economic or historical forces, such as colonialism
or the church, that affect class, cultural, religious and racial differences.175
With regard to the Oncale case, MacKinnon argued that when men suffer
from other men’s sexual violence, they play the role of “women” and therefore
merit protection under sex discrimination law.176 “Men's rape of women is a
hateful act designed to reinforce male supremacy. So is men's rape of men.”177
Male victims are abused as women are so often abused, except that women have a
Title VII remedy when their sexuality, and by extension, their gender, is assailed
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(2005).
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by men at work.178 In Oncale, MacKinnon argues that men deserve this
protection as well.179 Men who are victims are a sort of honorary women, “sisters
in suffering.”180 In this analysis, the gender of men is only the subject of rights to
the extent that it exists as an analogy to women. By this reasoning, men’s access
to protection from gender-based discrimination is through their similarity to
women. International women’s rights discourse mirrors this tangential rights
argument.181
Janet Halley has highlighted a more recent example of this thinking
deployed by feminists in the context of the debates over the classification of
sexual assault in the context of war crimes. Feminists attempted to redefine
sexual assault as a crime of “gender” as opposed to “sexual” violence.182 In a
case that involved a particularly gruesome sexual injury inflicted on a man in a
prison camp during the Balkan war, feminists voiced concern over the incident
because the castrated victim was rendered inferior and “like a woman.”183
Feminists argued that the incident perpetuated the prevailing male/female power
structure that they sought to overturn.184 Halley disagrees with this aspect of the
FU vision, arguing that it fosters a “chilling indifference to the suffering and death
of men.”185 Further, she asserts that “[t]his framing reproduces in reverse the
blind-spotted moral vision that it contests.”186
This concept of women extends the identity to anyone in the position of
the women, i.e. the subordinate position. Martha Fineman’s recent work reflects
this move, as she emphasizes the expansion of the feminist inquiry toward
examining the positionality of the vulnerable.187 Fineman introduces the concept
of the inherent human condition of vulnerability, which she views as a universal
constant that comprises the harms to which humans are vulnerable as the core
measure of inequality.188 Inequalities arise from state institutions and thus require
reform.189
Fineman suggests that a vulnerability analysis should replace an equal
protection analysis to shift the focus from discrimination against defined groups
toward inequitable structures.190 At the same time, she criticizes liberal notions of
equality as weak in the face of subordination and domination. A liberal model
fails to reform institutional arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage
178
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others.191 Fineman’s core criticism is that the identity categorized in the equal
protection analysis is both over and under inclusive, as it fails to reflect “lack of
opportunity categories” that transcends group boundaries.192 A vulnerability
approach recognizes individuals who live with the ever-present possibility that
our needs and circumstance will change and are not as rigid as the suspect class
groupings of an equal protection analysis.193
Alternatively, as Fineman suggests, vulnerability analysis focuses on the
structures our society has and will establish to manage our common
vulnerabilities.194 A more active and responsive state would serve to monitor
social equality in a way that the market cannot achieve.195 For this vulnerability
analysis to succeed, the state must empower vulnerable subjects, through
redistributive remedies if necessary.196 Where the state can identify clearly
advantaged and disadvantaged parties, the state must either justify the disparity or
remedy it.197 Fineman’s vulnerability theory introduces a new approach to
remedying inequality, beyond traditional identity categories, through the view that
equality is a universal resource that a responsive state advances by responding to
vulnerability.198
The MacKinnon and Fineman theories each do important work in
recognizing that sexist oppression targets something broader than biological
women. They each move beyond the essentialist understanding of women as a
biological reality. Each nonetheless retains an identitarian focus that impedes
their goal. Here, men (for MacKinnon) or the invulnerable (for Fineman) deserve
protection insofar as they may be defined as having some bit of womanhood or
vulnerability. The two theories parallel each other in the sense that both find a
substitute for “woman” that broadens the category to respond to identity
criticisms. Although Fineman’s theory seeks a more theoretically coherent route
out of identity category traps, vulnerability as a concept retains some referent to
identity markers.199 Both MacKinnon’s expansive definition of “women” and
Fineman’s shift to the “vulnerable” achieve certain goals in moving away from
the sex binary as a marker for rights protection.
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In sum, “women” reflects a crucial shortcoming in CEDAW’s text as
viewed from 2009: it reifies the sex binary instead of tearing it down. “Women”
misdiagnoses broader issues of sex and gender, leaving CEDAW short in
imagining potential solutions to inequality.
III.

Identity-Based Discrimination as CEDAW’s Raison d’Être

CEDAW’s focus on a universalized notion of “women” attempts to move
the world from hundreds of different gender systems to a universal one. It seems
at once boldly idealistic and fraught with incessant pitfalls as difference rears its
complicated head. The identity-based construction of CEDAW mistakenly places
discrimination as the principal harm of inequality, when a broader set of
inequities is at stake. The establishment of “women’s human rights” isolates
rather than emphasizes the role of gender in human rights discourse. Gender, a
term that reflects social and cultural traits typically associated with sex, is the
more appropriate subject of an international treaty. The focus of my argument is
the problem with “women” and the consequences of choosing “women” as the
central point for a discussion of rights related to sex and gender.
In this Part, I first contrast CEDAW with the Convention for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) to demonstrate the greater
consistencies in human rights claims made in the context of a non-identity based
treaty construction. Given the advantages of a non-identity based treaty, I then
discuss how “gender” or even “sex” would better address the concerns raised by
CEDAW because both address categories rather than specific identity groups. I
consider, and then dismiss, the risks of a term such as “gender.” Finally, I point
to the Yogyakarta Principles as an example of one possible direction for a nonidentity centered sex or gender treaty.
A.

International Law Beyond Identity

Legal theory, as useful as it may be, is not the only source for this antiidentitarian critique of CEDAW. Other international treaties that target inequality
deal with identity in more nuanced ways than the Convention. CEDAW
maladroitly relies on a minority-identity human rights model that is inappropriate
when women actually represent half of humanity. The artificial separation of
women’s rights into a distinct construction poses both theoretical and practical
limitations. Theoretical limitations include the challenge of understanding the
intersection of a group-based rights system, such as CEDAW, and a rights-based
system, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”). Indeed, some cite the ICCPR as a strong basis for sexuality rights.200
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Practical limitations isolate women’s issues from “human rights,” encouraging
human rights professionals to relegate gender inequality concerns to the province
of “women’s issues.”
Cosmopolitan human rights studies help distinguish the utility of identitybased terms, such as “women,” against category-based structures, such as
“gender” or “sex.” Unlike its contemporary human rights treaties, CEDAW
focuses on discrimination suffered by a particular group. It thus situates women’s
issues outside of human rights discussions and renders men as external to core
debates over gender inequality.201
A key example of a non-identitarian construction of human rights is the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”). CERD
entered into force in 1969, predating CEDAW by twelve years. Both instruments
implement two crucial U.N. covenants: the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The Covenants state that the “rights set forth therein are applicable to all
persons without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”202 Both these Covenants address rights at the universal level.
CERD, for example, demonstrates the weakness of CEDAW’s
minoritarian and identitarian focus by addressing a category of discrimination
rather than the identity of its victims. CERD’s methodology enables it to retain a
focus on the oppression in all its iterations without regard to a particular,
racialized group. This assessment demonstrates how CEDAW’s exclusive focus
on women isolates gender disparities from core human rights concerns and leads
to marginalization and nonenforcement, while forestalling real solutions to
appalling human rights dilemmas. This contrast reveals the import of a critical
examination of the choices made by the CEDAW drafters.
CERD and CEDAW attempt to translate these rights into the arena of
specific forms of oppression—racialized and sexist oppression. Both conventions
stem from one of the purposes of the United Nations—to achieve international
cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all people “without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion.”
Yet CERD and CEDAW diverge at the definition in Article I of CERD:
In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
Aleardo Zanghellini, To What Extent Does the ICCPR Support Procreation and Parenting by
Lesbian and Gay Men?, 9 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 125 (2008).
201
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202
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exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.203
CERD centers on racial discrimination, not singling out any group.
CEDAW mimics CERD’s initial definition but errs in focusing on a group
rather than oppressive categorizations. CERD’s very title reveals its proper focus
on systems of oppression rather than fixed identities, whereas CEDAW concerns
women as a group. Article I of CEDAW beings:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term
‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.204
CEDAW’s definition, unlike CERD’s, references a specific group—women. It
looks to the equality of men and women as a basis for the goal of eliminating
discrimination against women. The Convention’s definition presents women as
the only group suffering from discrimination based on sex. CERD, in contrast,
retains a focus on the oppression in its iterations without regard to a particular
racialized group. CEDAW’s identitarian approach to rights directs remedies
toward women rather than the eliminating the categories themselves.
One can argue CERD could not reference a specific group because of the
multi-racial nature of discrimination:205 no one group, say “black,” could be
defined against “white” the way that CEDAW can seek to protect “women” from
“men.” Race is an undeniably complex phenomenon. Even the most basic
understanding recognizes multiple races, as quoted in Loving v. Virginia,
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents.”206 More persuasive is the recent argument
that individuals do not belong to a race but are “racialized,” that is to say that
sociopolitical structures categorize certain phenotypes into groups. 207
Feminist universalists could point to CERD’s choice of nonidentitarian
language as a natural consequence of racial discrimination’s multiplicity. It is
true that throughout the globe, women consistently face measurable economic and
social harms. But deploying the identity “women” in this central fashion will not
lead to sexism’s end. It is worth noting that CERD arose at a time of anti203
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colonialist and “Third-World” discourse in which advocates of racial equality
pointed directly at the subjugation of the “brown people” by the “white
people.”208 CERD refrained from references to specific racial groups, while
CEDAW directly put identity at its core.
Race’s complexity does not dwarf gender’s complexity beyond the binary;
as described earlier, gender comprises many factors, biological, cultural and
social, each of which combine in multifarious ways to yield humanity. Certainly,
at the time of the drafting of CERD, and even in the subsequent time of
CEDAW’s drafting, the discrete categories of “men” and “women” seemed
legitimate. We now know that the gender diversity of humanity goes well beyond
the men/women binary, and thus criticizing CEDAW with CERD’s formulation
gains further legitimacy.
B.

The Argument for “Gender” and “Sex”

Because the problem with “women” is its identity-centered focus, either
“gender” or “sex” would be a more useful subject for international law. As Part II
detailed, “women” does not achieve what CEDAW seeks to achieve.209 In relying
on a specific group, CEDAW’s focus stands apart from many other human rights
instruments. Framing the issues as an oppositional binary sets women up to
continue to lose in this counterproductive relationship.
To eliminate
discrimination against women, men must be included in the design and
implementation of remedies. CEDAW’s exclusive focus on women debilitates
the Convention’s ability to imagine potential solutions to gender inequality. Two
other terms may serve as alternatives: “gender” and “sex.” Each term has its
advantages, but both terms achieve something “women” does not—they reach
beyond binarist constructs toward understanding relationships that concern not
just one group of people.

208

For period use of these terms, see e.g., JAMES RADO & GEROME RAGNI, HAIR: THE AMERICAN
TRIBAL
LOVE-ROCK
MUSICAL
(1967),
available
at
http://www.script-orama.com/movie_scripts/h/hair-script-transcript-play.html (last visited July 22, 2009). Hair’s
references to subjugation include the following lyrics: "The draft is white people sending black
people to make war on the yellow people to defend land they stole from the red people!" Id.
209
That is not to say that the women’s movement did not have any gender consciousness. To take
one example, “Free to Be You and Me,” a revolutionary mid-1970’s educational film about sex
differences, touted men who cry, boys who want dolls, and girls who wanted to be doctors and
lawyers, while mocking boyish boys and girly girls. Free to Be You and Me (Bell Records 1972).
Featured songs include “It’s Alright to Cry” sung by football star Rosie Greer, and “William’s
Doll,” performed by Alan Alda and Marlo Thomas. The film targeted secondary sex traits with the
scene of two babies trying to figure out who was a boy and who was a girl. Even this progressive
film stood on the presumption of a real biological difference between men and women, even as it
tried to tear social meaning from the male/female binary.
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1.

Argument for Gender

Gender, a term that reflects social and cultural traits typically associated
with sex, is the more appropriate subject of an international treaty. Gender is
defined as: “1 a: a grammatical category . . . 2 a: sexual identity, especially in
relation to society or culture 3 a: the condition of being male or female; sex . . .
.”210 Gender is commonly understood to reflect social and cultural traits typically
associated with sex. As Joan Wallach Scott puts it, “gender is the social
organization of sexual difference. But this does not mean that gender reflects or
implements fixed and natural physical differences between men and women;
rather gender is the knowledge that establishes meaning for bodily differences.”211
The key contribution of “gender,” Scott argues, is its “rejection of the
biological determinism implicit in the use of such terms as ‘sex’ or ‘sexual
difference.’”212 “Gender” denotes cultural constructions of “the entirely social
creation about appropriate roles for men and women,” incorporating an entire
system of relationships that may include sex, but is not directly determined by sex
nor directly determining of sexuality.213 Gender conveys the broader context in
which meaning is assigned to certain social traits, some of which may have some
biological connection, but many of which do not.
“Gender,” is more than a synonym for “women”—men have gender as
214
well.
All people – not just women - are gendered. However, feminists often
mistakenly deploy the word “gender“ as a synonym for “women,” an act that fails
to capitalize on the full breadth of the word’s import.215 Although women’s
ordeals hold a central place in gender inequality, ignoring other people and the
broader, gendered power disparities will push CEDAW further down the path of
inefficacy. Remedies for inequality solely based on group identity will not rectify
sexist policies. Gender inequality afflicts all people, including men and
transgender people, the subject of Part IV. By addressing gender inequality in all
of its manifestations, international law would be better positioned to accomplish
feminist goals. Focusing on women blinds CEDAW to a broader view of gender
equality.

210

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 731.
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 2 (1988). Scott continues by
stating “We cannot see sexual difference except as a function of our knowledge about the body
and that knowledge is not ‘pure,’ cannot be isolated from its implication in a broad range of
discourse contexts.” Id.
212
Id. at 29.
213
Id. at 32.
214
Thanks to Kendall Thomas for this phrasing.
215
See Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note at 78 (“[S]exuality and gender are structurally
committed to male domination and female subordination. If a man--or boy--is injured in sexuality
or gender, that cannot be because masculinity has become a site of harm”).
211
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a.

Clarifying Goals: Minimizing the Gender Binarism

As I identified in a prior Article on transgender prisoners, one can locate
most of the inequality and mistreatment that transgender people, and indeed all
people, face in the gender binarism.216 The rigid separation of the world into two
sexes carries many harms. Subordinations based on gender define myriad sociolegal problems, including economic inequality and employment discrimination, as
well as “private” issues such as spousal and child abuse and rape.217 One’s
gender is a fundamental aspect of one's identity, perhaps the most fundamental
given the legal coercion of individuals into one of the two sexes, "male" or
"female." Each of these problems entails elements of the "compulsory
gendering"—the forced adherence to the gender binarism discussed in Part
One.218
Otto’s work supports this argument— that the ultimate goal is to dismantle
the harmful gender binaries that have always underpinned women’s human rights
law.219 Gender must be conceptualized “as something other than a dichotomy,”220
formulated to reflect “the hybrid result of choices and desires, rather than either
male or female.”221 Human rights advocates must see gender hierarchy as the
issue, rather than binary sex difference.222
b.

Cultural Variability

Cultural variation forms a central core of what defines gender. Sex,
referring to biological difference, may vary slightly from country to country,
depending on how available and commonplace transgender medical procedures
are.223 Gender, in contrast, varies substantially from country to country.224

216

See generally Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing, supra note 139.
Id. at 561.
218
Id.
219
Otto, supra note 97, at 121.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 126.
222
Id. at 127. She suggests one way to reinvent gender as a hybrid—through the recovery “of
women’s lost histories of grassroots resistance,” which often reveal “female subjectivities who are
not defined by their gendered injuries and colonial victimhood, but have the agency to struggle for
their rights.” Id.
223
In the United States, for example, it is general practice Medicare and private insurance does not
cover sex reassignment surgery. See Rebecca Mann, The Treatment of Transgender Prisoners, Not
Just An American Problem—A Comparative Analysis of American, Australian, and Canadian
Prison Policies Concerning the Treatment of Transgender Prisoners and a “Universal”
Recommendation to Improve Treatment, 15 Law & Sexuality 91, 101-03 (2006). On the other
hand, Medicaid does not specifically exclude sex reassignment surgery. Id. , In Canada, sex
reassignment surgery has recently been reinstated as a procedure covered by national insurance.
Advocate.com, Public Funding Reinstated for Sex Reassignment in Ontario, May 23 2008,
http://www.advocate.com/news_detail_ektid54783.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
224.
See generally Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
217
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Gender depends on culture, and this cultural dependence makes gender the more
fundamental category than sex,225 necessarily involving the power differential in
the relationship between genders. Gender differs across societies on many axes;
though they may defy easy definition, such differences exist nonetheless.226
Socioeconomic factors construct the relationship between gender and the
public/private dichotomy. Differing family structures and social policies may
consign women (generally) to managing the home or free them to work in the
public workplace.227 Women’s “private” roles affect their potential to assume
“public” responsibilities.228 These socioeconomic factors, including those of class
and race, help to construct gender as a power differential between men and
women along the sex binary.229
Although “gender” raises questions of cultural contingency and
mutability, this contingent awareness of cultural differences is a source of power,
as it would foster more effective internalization of international norms.230
225

Id. at 40.
See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 804. A quick glance at other
comparative work on gender identity reveals the extent to which universal norms ignore gender’s
cultural construction. For example, Thai and Indian gender identities incorporate both sharply
divergent gender and sexual identities. See Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, supra note 110. In
recent years, gay social movements emerged across the globe which drew on a Western model
based on the relationship between sexual identity and sexual conduct. Id. at 137. The
globalization of the Western model collided with pre-existing transgendered meaning of
homosexuality and has significantly contributed to the alienation and disenfranchisement of
Thailand’s kathoeys—commonly called a “third sex”—within both popular and academic
discourses. Id. at 136–38. India opted for the term MSM, or men who have sex with men. Id. at
153. MSM refers “to men from all age groups, marital status, economic classes, educational
backgrounds, caste and religious communities, sexual identities, and gender identities who engage
in sexual activity with other men.” Id. Thus, India and Thailand clearly demonstrate that the
substitutive model of the Western world may be inadequate for obtaining protection for the vast
numbers of sexual minorities throughout the world. Id. at 101–02. Larry Catá Backer has
contrasted the constructions of gender and sexuality in Malaysia, Zimbabwe, and the United
States. See Backer, Emasculated Men, supra note 111.
227
See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 804. National laws govern abortion,
leading to larger or smaller families. Public policy provides or denies daycare, public education
and healthcare. Countries with extensive social services generally have higher levels of women’s
workforce penetration.
228
Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 19.
229
Joan Scott explains this point nicely: “The core of [my] definition [of gender] rests on an
integral connection between two propositions: gender is a constructive element of social
relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of
signifying relationships of power.” SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY, supra note
211, at 42. “Gender . . . provides a way to decode meaning and to understand the complex
connections among various forms of human interaction.” Id. at 45-46. “We can write the history of
that [political] process only if we recognize that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are at once empty and
overflowing categories.
Empty because they have no ultimate, transcendent meaning.
Overflowing because even when they appear to be fixed, they still contain within them alternative,
denied, or suppressed definitions.” Id. at 49. “[G]ender must be redefined and restructured in
conjunction with a vision of political and social equality that includes not only sex but class and
race.” Id. at 50.
230
See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10, at 807.
226
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c.

“Gender” as an Established Category

More recent international interventions by feminists have placed “gender”
at the core of such efforts. In the past decade, international institutions from the
International Criminal Court to the World Bank have begun to address gender
issues directly, sometimes reflecting a more nuanced understanding of sex and
gender than that of CEDAW. The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund have adopted and currently enforce explicit gender equality norms.231 Over
the past decade or so, “gender” has been the language of gender mainstreaming
efforts to facilitate the inclusion of women and gender issues in all United Nations
efforts.232 The international legal use of the term “gender” has acquired wide
currency without a clearly used definition. In this sense, “gender” copies
CEDAW’s use of “women.”
231

See Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 19. In this article I discuss the implications of
the adoption of gender equality norms in both directions – in advancing these norms, but also in
defining them in ways that benefit international financial institutions. My argument, that this
interaction reflects a symbiosis between public and private sectors, builds on Kerry Rittich’s work.
Kerry Rittich, Engendering Development/Marketing Equality, 67 ALB. L. REV. 575 (2003)
[hereinafter Rittich, Engendering Development] (analyzing a World Bank report that proposes a
strategy that rests on the use of market incentives to discourage gender discrimination, rather than
the international law approach of holding the state responsible for gender equality); Kerry Rittich,
The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the
Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199, 200 (2004) [hereinafter Rittich, The Future of Law and
Development] (emphasizing market-centered types of social equality and inclusion, social justice
is framed in market terms, which focuses on changes that yield economic results).
232
CHRISTINE CHINKIN & FLORENCE BUTEGWA, GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS 25-32 (2001). Critics of gender mainstreaming argue that the use of
“gender” in “gender mainstreaming” simply reifies the male/female divide. In a discussion on the
United Nation’s approach to human rights violations, Johanna Bond devotes a whole subsection to
gender mainstreaming. Bond argues that a theoretical and practical shift must occur which places
intersectionality theory at the forefront of contemporary human rights discourse and activism,
precisely because a monolithic understanding of women does not address the reality of oppression
as encountered across multiple axes. In support of her thesis, she contends that gender
mainstreaming cannot truly implement change because it does not rise to the level of inclusiveness
that intersectionality does. According to Bond, intersectionality requires more than “’adding
women to the mix,’” yet gender mainstreaming “merely requires that both men and women be
included as analytical subjects” and “tends to be essentialist” in that it “treats women as a
monolithic group.” Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and
Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71,
140 (2003). Furthermore, gender mainstreaming efforts come not from an “understanding of
intersectionality…but from a desire to merely comply with a top-down directive to ‘gender
mainstream.’” Id. at 141. This motivation is especially problematic because it allows the United
Nations to ignore the extent and the ways in which other systems of oppression work in tandem
with sex discrimination, yet affect different women in vastly different ways. Bond calls on the
CEDAW committee to issue a general recommendation directing states to investigate the
intersectionality of various identity categories and to specifically address “intersectionality as it
relates to discrimination based on sexual orientation.” Id. at 162. She further argues that
heterosexism should be included as an explicitly prohibited form of discrimination, which would
not result in an expansion of rights, but a more “nuanced understanding of States’ parties existing
obligations.” Id. at 163.
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Valerie Oosterveld describes the United Nations approach on defining
“gender,” in which it does not really define the term at all, as “minimalist.”233
The term has appeared in U.N. documents without any overt or implicit
explanation of its meaning for over a decade.234 The term was included in the
Beijing Platform without being defined, although the President of the Conference
was pressured by opposing states into making a statement which declared that the
“ordinarily, generally accepted usage” of the term was “intended to be
interpreted.”235 More recent uses have involved a clearer definition, one whose
meaning emphasizes that it is a social construction, influenced by culture, and that
“the content of ‘gender’ can vary within and among cultures, and over time.”236
Two sites for international debate on the term “gender” reveal the political
sensitivity that greets this debate. First, at the Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing, certain conservative states strongly opposed the inclusion of
the word “gender” in the absence of a satisfactory statement or definition.237 The
main argument of this opposition was that the “term might sanction rights based
on sexual orientation.”238 Thus, “gender” stood as a marker for a broader
conceptualization of sex, with objectionable political implications for
conservative, religiously-oriented states. The term also aroused substantial overt
debate in the negotiations over the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) (1998). Many feminists engaged in the debate around the passage
of the Rome Statute and the creation of the International Criminal Court sought
broader use of the term “gender,” an effort that became the subject of extensive
maneuvering.239 Oosterveld points to the core disagreement among states in the
negotiations process. As in Beijing, States which sought to retain the term
“gender” were “committed to ensuring that any definition adopted would reflect
that ‘gender’ refers to socially constructed understandings of what it means to be
male or female.”240 The states that opposed the term “insisted on reference to
‘two sexes’ and agreed on the inclusion of a reference to the broadly-phrased
‘society.’”241

233

Oosterveld, supra note 90, at 66. Thanks to Janet Halley for this crucial source.
Id.
235
Id. at 67.
236
Id. For example, the Yogyakarta Principles reflect a more contemporary understanding of
“gender.”
See
The
Yogyakarta
Principles
(March
2007),
available
at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm.
237
Id. at 62.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 64.
241
Id. Oosterveld correctly recognizes that it is important to predict how the ICC will interpret the
term because their interpretation will “have a direct impact on the kinds of cases of persecution
that the court may be able to prosecute, as well as on the law applied…and on the protection and
participation of victims and witnesses.” Id. at 57. She points out that U.N. interagency definitions
may favor women’s rights more clearly, but they have been eclipsed by the minimalist approach at
the multilateral level, precisely because states disagree on the definition with great conviction.
Obviously, the Rome Statute departs from the minimalist trend at the multilateral level, as it
234
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These “gender” efforts raise the core debates over gender equality.
Continuing this debate, even with its challenges, can achieve more when brought
into the defining aspect of CEDAW—its focus on women. Opponents of
“gender” may rely on the potential of a return to the clearer time when feminists
sought rights for “women.” Women, whose issues could be divorced from that of
humans. Women, whose issues could be handled as an afterthought by largely
male-run states. Unsexing CEDAW could place women’s issues back into the
orbit of human rights by focusing on “gender,” a reality that affects everyone’s
lives. Although “gender” arouses the opposition of conservative states, it does not
necessarily contain a particular perspective. Joan Scott argues that “gender” does
not incorporate some particular normative stance as to how it exists or what
should be changed. “Although gender in this usage asserts that relationships
between the sexes are social, it says nothing about why these relationships are
constructed as they are, how they work, or how they change.”242 In this sense,
conservative states that oppose the use of “gender” may be mistaken. Although
the content of the meaning of “gender” as I use it runs counter to certain
conservative norms, “gender” does not necessarily involve fluidity in sexual
norms.243

contains an explicit definition of the term. Nevertheless, the definition ultimately adopted in the
Statute is far removed from the detailed United Nations’ approach. Id.
242
SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY, supra note 211, at 32-33.
243
That said, it is unsurprising that conservative states oppose attention to gender. Even though
the current text of CEDAW does not reference gender, CEDAW opposition groups in the US are
concerned that the document already seeks to legalize same-sex marriage. Harold Hongju Koh,
Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
263, 273-74 (2002). Opposition groups point to actions by CEDAW’s Committee that suggested
that state laws against lesbianism be abolished and that “lesbianism be reconceptualized as a
sexual orientation.” Laurel MacLeod and Catherine Hurlburt, Concerned Women for America
Strongly
Oppose
CEDAW
(September
2000),
available
at
http://www.cwfa.org/printerfriendly.asp?id=1971&department=cwa&%20categoryid=nation
If
the text was changed to “gender,” the outcry from conservative groups against CEDAW because
of fear of homosexual and transgender rights would likely be louder. The Yogyakarta Principles,
which directly deal with issues of gender and sexuality, enshrine much of what conservative states
fear about a revised interpretation of CEDAW. See The Yogyakarta Principles (March 2007),
available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm.
Opposition to using
"gender" has already surfaced during the negotiation of other international treaties. While
negotiating the Rome Treaty, conservative nongovernmental organizations distributed lobby
papers calling for the deletion of both "gender balance" and the reference to judicial expertise in
sexual and gender violence. Oosterveld, supra note 90, at 61. Such groups believed that using the
term "gender sensitivity" would "undermine traditional moral, cultural and traditional values."
David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Impartiality in the Election of Judges,
available
at
http://www.worldfamilypolicycenter.org/wfpc/About_the_WFPC/papers/icc_report.html#AppH1
(last visited Jan. 12, 2005). Groups opposed to the use of the term “gender” wanted a definition
that only referred to “the two sexes, male and female.” Oosterveld, supra note 90, at 65. Certain
conservative groups also made their views on the term “gender” known at the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action and the 1996 Habitat World Conference. Id. at 65-66.
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2.

The Argument for “Sex”

Although “gender” has already taken hold in international law contexts,
“sex” holds certain distinct advantages over “gender.” First, “sex” already
appears in the text of CEDAW, notably in the definition of “discrimination” in
Article 1, but the word only makes rare appearances in CEDAW’s text. A
broader use of “sex” would depart from CEDAW’s women-centered approach.
“Sex” does not presume the primacy of sex difference, in the way that
“gender” does. Joan Scott writes that “[t]he term gender suggests that relations
between the sexes are a primary aspect of social organization . . . and that
differences between the sexes constitute and are constituted by hierarchical and
social structures.”244 “Gender” presumes a centrality to these differences that
normatively supports positions that may not be valid. Second, “sex,” in contrast
to “gender,” refers generally to a biological difference. Although feminist theory
has largely and rightly run from biological essentialism, references to biological
categories may be useful, particularly given how mutable they are. “Sex” may
reinforce the male/female binarism until one considers the increasingly common
transition between “sexes” and the concomitant realization that for many “sex”
(manifested in changeable bodies) is more fluid than “gender” (embodied in a less
mutable self-identity).245
The aversion to “sex” may arise from one key challenge: the confusion in
English and other languages between “sex,” meaning “purported bodily difference
between men and women,”246 and “sex,” meaning erotic activity. Janet Halley
nicely labels the former “sex1” and the latter “sex2,”247 and while for academic
debate this stands unchallenged in its clarity, these monikers would not enter into
the international law lexicon. This confusion between sex1 and sex2 heightens
widespread discomfort around sexuality. Indeed, the widespread use of “gender”
in the United States has as its origin a decision by Ruth Bader Ginsburg while
serving as the leading litigator of women’s rights in the 1970’s.248 Ginsburg
decided to use “gender” because she feared that using the term “sex” might make
244

Id. at 25.
Thanks to Elizabeth Emens for phrasing this distinction so clearly.
246
JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 14. Halley defines sex1 and sex2 as follows:
“Sex1…. the purported bodily difference between men and women. The supposedly irreducible
fact of biological dimorphism. ‘Is it a boy or a girl?’ Penis or vagina, testicles or ovaries,
testosterone or estrogen, and so forth. Sex2…. everything that turns us on. The erotic. The
paradigm here is ‘fucking,’ but it could be (for you) the vibration of your car or your unconscious
wish to sleep with your mother and kill your father.” Id. at 24.
247
Id. Halley defines sex1 and sex2 as follows: “Sex1…. the purported bodily difference between
men and women. The supposedly irreducible fact of biological dimorphism. ‘Is it a boy or a girl?’
Penis or vagina, testicles or ovaries, testosterone or estrogen, and so forth. Sex2…. everything
that turns us on. The erotic. The paradigm here is “fucking,” but it could be (for you) the vibration
of your car or your unconscious wish to sleep with your mother and kill your father.” Id. at 24.
248
The Supreme Court; Excerpts From Senate Hearing on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1993, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/us/the-supreme-courtexcerpts-from-senate-hearing-on-the-ginsburg-nomination.html?scp=1&sq=ginsburg&st=nyt.
Thanks to Elizabeth Emens for reminding me of this historical moment.
245
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the judges deciding discrimination cases uncomfortable.249 “Gender” thus came
to play a large role in sex discrimination law.250 Although Ginsburg’s reticence to
use “sex” may reflect another era in which sexuality was lived largely in private,
for many the confusion between the two terms may render “gender” more
functional.
Conservative states may prefer “sex” to “gender” for two reasons. The
biological referent may make “sex” seem less open to broader interpretation than
“gender.” “Sex” could refer to biological identity rather than “gender,” which
may be more subject to focus on gender roles and stereotyping. In addition, many
link sexual orientation to gender stereotyping—a linkage that further expands the
potential radicalism of “gender.” Political feasibility possibly makes “sex” a
more palatable subject for CEDAW than “gender.”
“Sex” and even “gender,” for that matter, do not necessarily imply
identity-neutral policies. Feminists and others who have worked on identity
related equality issues over the past two decades emphasize the danger of identityneutral policies.251 Gender-blindness, like colorblindness, would be subject to
substantial and worthwhile critiques by critical thinkers. As I have previously
argued, equality efforts depend on a culturally aware but rigorous consideration of
how to balance principles of legal neutrality with the importance of identityspecific remedies.252 Unsexing CEDAW does not entail a liberal notion of “sex
neutrality,”253 a liberal position such as that present in early U.S. Supreme Court
sex discrimination jurisprudence.254 Using “gender” as the principal framework
establishes room for the inclusion of women’s rights and women-specific issues.
Switching the focus to “gender” would not eliminate the ability of international
law to address issues unique to women such as female genital cutting and
pregnancy, as well as issues that predominantly affect women, such as domestic
violence. The identitarian specificity of referencing women within a genderbased treaty may seem at odds with a focus on gender. Yet identity-based
categories serve useful purposes when considered in temporal and geographical
context.255

249

Id.
Id.
251
Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gender: An Anti-Essentialist
Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 19 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001).
252
Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 10.
253
Formal equality between men and women – treating them the same – is part of the sex
neutrality jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. The perfect example is Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484 (1974), which held that denying women disabled by pregnancy a benefit otherwise
available for disabled employees does not violate the law against sex discrimination, since it treats
non-pregnant women and non-pregnant men the same way. See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
254
Geduldig is the perfect example of this “sex neutral” vision, insofar as it focuses so little on the
contextual differences between men and women. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484.
255
See Mansbridge, supra note 251.
250
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Both “gender,” with its broad interpretative potential and “sex,” with its
political appeal, succeed in shifting away from group-identity advocacy, yet many
maintain “women” should remain central to international law efforts.
3.

Counterarguments for Keeping “Women”

One may argue that the dichotomy between women and gender is a false
one. Under this argument, even if gender/women is a false dichotomy, and I
admit at some level it is, the way out within CEDAW’s current structure is to
interpret “women” as meaning “gender.” Yet even if that were to occur, it would
not solve the problem of the core question of exclusion from the purpose of the
treaty. For example, others may argue that the use of the term “gender” is a
luxury, available and useful in the more gender-balanced nations of the developed
world.256
Indeed, substantial resistance to the use of “gender” in the place of
“women” surfaced at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, focused
on the fear of a shift away from women’s oppression.257 Some feminist activists
from the global South asserted that “gender” watered down their efforts.258 One
activist argued that “the focus on gender, rather than women, had become
counter-productive in that it had allowed the discussion to shift from a focus on
women, to women and men, and finally, back to men.”259 This point was
supported by another activist who argued that, in Jamaica, “the shift in discourse
from women to gender had resulted . . . in a focus away from women, to ‘men at
risk,’ reflecting concern about men’s failure in education and in securing
employment, while women perform much better educationally and many support
families alone.”260 “Gender,” some argued, denied women-specific oppression
and allowed government and entities to ignore the need for female-targeted
measures and policies.261

256

See RHONDA COPELON, WRITING GENDER INTO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT STATUTE (2000).
257
Sally Baden & Anne Marie Goetz, Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]?:
Conflicting discourses on gender at Beijing, in FEMINIST VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT: GENDER
ANALYSIS AND POLICY 19, 21 (Cecile Jackson & Ruth Pearson eds., 1998) (quoting Nighat Khan
of Pakistan).
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. (quoting Eudine Barriteau of Jamaica).
261
Id. Baden and Goetz also discuss how instrumental arguments have been used to hasten the
process of gender mainstreaming within institutions. One such argument justifies “the need to
invest in female education,” with the end of serving “population control and child welfare goals.”
Id. at 24. It is noted that such arguments may be successful in bringing attention to women’s
issues, but they are also problematic “in that they often result in women or gender being simply a
means to other ends.” Id. The authors suggest that Southern women’s hostility towards the new
discourse is a result of their perception of gender mainstreaming as “an external agenda” imposed
mostly by Northern development agencies, who are generally not held accountable to the Southern
women they claim to work for. Id. at 25.
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One concern is precisely the opposite of Joan Scott’s assertion—that
“[gender] can be used in a very descriptive way and the question of power can be
easily removed.”262 As referenced above, controversy greeted the debate over
whether the Beijing Conference was about “sex” or “gender.”263 Those opposed
to the use of “gender” feared that, taken to its logical extreme, the argument about
social construction must eventually deconstruct the body, a dilemma that has
divided feminists themselves.264 These disputes reveal the advantage of a term
like “women,” that avoids some of these debates.
Yet “women” retains a group reference that undermines the cause of
CEDAW. My goal here is not to resolve the “sex”/”gender” dispute in favor of
one term or the other. It is important to note that even activists and others
working intensively with these issues flip terms sometimes indiscriminately.
Feminists sometimes deploy social constructivist arguments “when convenient,
and biologically essentialist ones at other times.”265 Policy arguments follow
“sex” and/or “gender” used in “contradictory ways.”266 This imprecision aside,
for the purposes of this critique of CEDAW, either term performs a sea-change in
international law when contrasted with “women.” “Gender” or “sex” both avoid
referencing a specific group identity; either succeeds in bringing us away from
group-based constructions of rights that take us away from the goals of gender
equality.
C.

Anti-Women Discrimination or Human Rights?

CEDAW relies on an anti-discrimination model that places “women” in a
central position as current and potential victims. This anti-discrimination model
frames women’s issues as separate from human rights issues. Discrimination
implies an identity-related focus. Article 1 clearly defines discrimination: “any
262

Id.
Id. at 25-26. The conservative reaction to “gender” “highlighted inconsistencies and areas of
neglect in contemporary feminist approaches to the constitution of gender identity and political
subjectivity…” Id. “To develop this argument,” a conservative essay distributed at the NGO
Forum is analyzed. Id. at 28. In the essay, author Dale O’Leary translates the feminist “code
words” of “free choice in reproduction” as limitless abortions and “”lifestyle” as homosexuality.
Id.
264
According to Linda Nicholson, some feminists perceive “gender” to “stress the social construct
in contrast to the biological given.” Others use “gender” to refer to “any social construction
having to do with the male/female, as opposed to the masculine/feminine distinction (citation
omitted).” Id. at 29 (quoting Linda Nicholson). Despite these problems, the authors believe that
there is sufficient commonality among women to “bear testimony” to their “genuine sense of
connection.” Id. at 33-34. It is contended that if women pay “attention to the various paths by
which we each come to be ‘sexed,’” it should “help ensure that we avoid sinking back to reductive
essentialisms.” Id. at 34. The authors never take a definitive stance with regards to the efficiency
of the discourse switch and conclude by restating the need for feminist researchers to dialogue,
especially with those working outside of a feminist agenda.
265
Id. at 31.
266
Id. at 21. For instance, the rejection of gender in the conference document was believed to
signify homophobia, but one lesbian women stated she was “’born a lesbian.’” Id. at 31.
263
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distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”267 Discrimination is
referenced in the broader sense, including what those in the United States would
call “disparate impact” discrimination, in which inequality may reflect
discrimination. In common usage, however, the term “discrimination” has a
much narrower meaning of an arbitrary decision based on some characteristic,
such as sex, race, sexual orientation or ability.268
CEDAW’s definition is broader than this, but it still misdiagnoses
“women’s” suffering as discrimination, rather than a pervasive set of oppressive
social relations; one that surpasses the confines of any specific group of
victims.269 CEDAW’s focus is mistaken—it approaches the suffering women
face due to sexism as if women were a discrete minority. In addition, CEDAW’s
focus on “women” allows mainstream “human rights” law to remove gender
justice projects from its scope. This discrimination model constructs an
oppositional world of discriminators or their victims. CEDAW’s urge to
“eliminate all forms of discrimination against women” envisions a class of
passive victims and discrimination by an unspecified person or group.
Concentrating exclusively on women both isolates gender disparities from core
human rights concerns and forestalls real solutions to appalling human rights
dilemmas.
Reassessing the discrimination model reveals the importance of reinserting
“women” into human rights considerations. Catharine MacKinnon recently asked
“Are women human?,”270 and CEDAW’s answer, by its existence outside of
human rights, is that they are not. Feminist activists sought to delineate separate
rights for women because they viewed already established human rights norms as
excluding women’s concerns.271 Although women’s rights were asserted in this
separate construction initially, more recently the relationship has become one in
which women’s rights are human rights. “The hope was that making ‘universal’
human rights more responsive to women’s specific human rights violations would
not only impact on human rights law, but also provide a new focus for the
women-in-development agenda,” Otto explains.272 The women rights-are-human
rights strategy had the goals of forcing the recognition at the international level of

267

CEDAW, supra note 5.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (8th ed. 2004).
269
To the extent that CEDAW reflects this continued emphasis on a discrimination model over a
human rights model, it may also reflect U.S. feminists’ predominance at the time of CEDAW’s
drafting.
270
MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 2.
271
Hilary Charlesworth, What are ‘Women’s International Human Rights?’, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN 58, 63 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994). Charlesworth notes that “as in all areas of
international law, women have been almost entirely excluded from the important human rights
fora where standards are defined, monitored, and implemented. Id.
272
Otto, supra note 97, at 121.
268
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female-specific human rights violations as universal human rights violations and
to institute gender mainstreaming.273
The women-centered human rights strategy not only reified the sex binary,
but it also moved women’s rights further from the human rights agenda.274
Feminists eventually pursued another strategy to correct this unintended effect of
CEDAW—“the women’s rights-are-human rights strategy.”275 This approach
sought to demonstrate that women-specific rights violations are also human rights
violations. One of its main achievements was the recognition of gendered
violence as a human rights violation, however, a considerable amount of energy
was expended on detailing the practices of non-Western cultures—giving “new
credence to the “‘native victim’ subject.”276 The other goal of this approach is the
“mainstreaming” of women’s issues into the general human rights discourse.
Although Otto believes that mainstreaming has been “met with considerable
success,”277 she points out that it also “continues to affirm the masculinity of the
universal subject who needs no special enumeration of his gender-specific
injuries.”278
Dianne Otto argues that the most promising solution to the aforementioned
dilemmas of women’s identity and the relationship between women’s rights and
human rights would be the creation of human rights law that recognizes gender
identity as a “…hybrid result of choices and desire, rather than either male or
female.”279 Despite the above-discussed risk of re-emphasizing men’s rights,280 in
this re-emphasis of the human rights model’s relevance regarding gender issues,

273

Id. at 121-122. The success of the first goal is manifested in the Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women (DEVAW). However, Otto notes that DEVAW does not state that
violence against women is a violation of human rights generally. Furthermore, focusing on
violence against women replicates the passive, vulnerable female subjectivity. The condemnation
of cultural violent practices also replicates the “native victim” subject. Id. at 122. The gender
mainstreaming goal has also been “met with considerable success,” as demonstrated through “the
adoption of General Comments or General Recommendations that provide authoritative
interpretations of the coverage of women’s rights by the treaty texts.” Id. at 123. Although Otto
recognizes that “the extensive cataloging of women’s injuries and disadvantages” is “…clearly
necessary for making women’s human rights abuses legally cognisable,” she also asserts that the
mainstreaming approach “continues to affirm the masculinity of the universal subject who needs
no special enumeration of his gender-specific injuries.” Id. Because of this “dynamic”, Otto
believes that it may be “impossible” to disrupt “gender hierarchies through human rights law.” Id.
at 124.; See generally CHRISTINE CHINKIN & FLORENCE BUTEGWA, GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (2001).
274
Id. at 120.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 122.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 123.
279
Id. at 126.
280
However, the destruction of the dichotomous notions of sex which would result by recognizing
the fluidity of gender may… “threaten the erasure of the female subject and her gender-specific
human rights violations, and it may still reassert the masculine as the universal in the image of the
hybrid.” Id.
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sexuality-related rights must figure at the core of the construction of gender-based
rights.
Gender, with its explicit focus on social and cultural relations, could bring
sexuality into the center of the architecture of international human rights law.
Conservative states feared precisely this implied meaning of “gender” as “sexual
orientation.” The absence of this consideration under CEDAW is one crucial
casualty of its emphasis on “women.”281 Decisions regarding reproductive
freedom, prevention and care for HIV-related illness, and other sexuality-related
rights belong at the core of an international treaty. The existence of many
culturally different constructions of gender reveals the limitation of CEDAW's
emphasis on the category “women.” Given the interaction of these categories, an
international convention on “women” should also be a convention on gender, and
for that matter, on sexuality. Gender differentials reflect the dynamic relationship
among identities of sex, gender, and sexuality, as Frank Valdes has explored.282
These relations necessarily vary across cultures.283
Activists have made recent attempts to broaden the meaning of CEDAW
to include gender and sexuality related discrimination. In Equal and Indivisible:
Crafting Inclusive Shadow Reports for CEDAW, the International Gay and
Lesbian Human Rights Commission, a United States-based non-governmental
organization, makes a valiant effort to show how shadow reports for the CEDAW
Committee may further recognition of discrimination against “LBT” women on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.284 Equal and Indivisible
encourages a broader interpretation of CEDAW,285 one that differentiates between

281

It is worth noting that conservative states might attempt to increase their reservations in a treaty
based on gender rather than “women.”
282
See generally Valdes, supra note 117.
283
See generally Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance, supra note 16.
284
See INT’L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, EQUAL AND INDIVISIBLE: CRAFTING
INCLUSIVE SHADOW REPORTS FOR CEDAW 17 (2009), available at http://www.iglhrc.org/cgibin/iowa/article/publications/reportsandpublications/945.html
(hereinafter
“EQUAL
AND
INDIVISIBLE”).
285
The handbook provides a list of relevant sections of CEDAW that “are relevant to activists
working on sexual orientation and gender identity.” Id. These seven points focus on the
interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights that the CEDAW Convention reinforces,
including elimination of public and private discrimination, gender stereotypes, and gender based
violence. Id. With each of these points, the handbook advocates that it is both necessary and
appropriate to interpret CEDAW to apply to discrimination of LBT women. For example, the
handbook points out that “Article 2 addresses the obligations for states to respect, protect and
fulfill rights, while Article 5 addresses cultural stereotypes.” Id. The guide argues that this applies
to stereotypes based on sexual orientation and gender identity, as normative gender roles are
deeply rooted in those stereotypes.” Id.
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“sex” and “gender” and rejects the sex binary.286 These “shadow reports” permit
the CEDAW Committee to consider a broader set of rights abuses.287
The Yogyakarta Principles (“The Principles”) go beyond Equal and
Indivisible to support a reframed vision of gender and sexual rights. The
Principles, a non-binding statement by international law experts from 25
countries, is one example. The experts met from November 6-9, 2006, at Gadjah
Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to draft a document articulating
principles of international human rights law in relation to gender identity and to
sexual orientation.288 Responding to the “need for a more comprehensive
articulation of [sexual orientation and gender identity] rights in international
law”289 and to the desire for a “more consistent terminology to address issues of
sexual orientation and gender identity,” each of the 29 Principles articulate how
international human rights law should protect gender and sexuality rights. The
Principles also suggest how States should implement such legal obligations.290
The Principles have been the object of substantial international attention and
debate by legislative bodies, NGOs, and groups opposed to the rights of sexual
minorities as they have been translated into the six languages of the United

286

Id. The handbook emphasizes the importance and necessity of recognizing the difference
between sex and gender. Id. at 16. The handbook states that, “[b]y explicitly acknowledging the
difference between sex and gender, the CEDAW Committee could facilitate a more profound
debate on socially constructed norms and their effects on all women.” Id.
287
Id. Equal and Indivisible also provides examples of discrimination against women and
suggests questions to help evaluate whether human rights violations are occurring on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity. Id. at 21-35. The areas include: (1) violence against women,
including sexual violence and violence in the law enforcement, (2) recognition of a person’s
gender identity, (3) forced marriage and discrimination on the grounds of marital status, (4)
discrimination against human rights LBT human rights defenders, (5) right to education, (6) right
of health, including discrimination and the right to health, medical “treatment” of homosexuality,
discrimination and HIV/AIDS and (7) discrimination in employment and housing. Id. Many of
these examples come from shadow reports, lending further support to the importance this
reporting mechanism.
288
Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 232-34
(2008). O’Flaherty served as Rapporteur for the development of the Principles.
289
Id. at 232; Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Address to the
International Conference on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Human Rights (July 26,
2006),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/B91AE52651D33F0DC12571BE002F172C?
opendocument.
290
O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 288, at 233, 232-34. According to the Rapporteur for the
Principles, the conclave intended the principles to serve a tripartite function: (1) “constitute a
‘mapping’ of the experiences of human rights violations experienced by people of diverse sexual
orientations and gender identities”; (2) clear and precise application of international human rights
law to such experiences; and (3) a detailed list of the obligations on States for “effective
implementation of each of the human rights obligations.” The Yogyakarta Principles, available at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org.
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Nations.291 The Principles convey a core value in the “freedom to express
oneself, one’s identity and one’s sexuality, without State interference based on
sexual orientation or gender identity.”292 The drafters deployed broad definitions
of sexual orientation, gender, and gender identity.293 Although the drafters note
that the Principles “must rely on the current state of international human rights
law” and thus will require international law revision to reflect legal developments,
it is worth noting that the recommended actions are not only addressed to States,
but also to NGOs, the media, and other non-State actors.294 Although the
Principles remain an aspiration for many, they have garnered substantial
attention.295 One scholar has expressed the concern that the Principles are vague
291

O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 288, at 237-47; Piero A. Tozzi, Six Problems with the
“Yogyakarta Principles”, CATHOLIC FAMILY & HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, Apr. 2, 2002,
http://www.c-fam.org/docLib/20080610_Yogyakarta_Principles.pdf.
292
Article
19,
The
Yogyakarta
Principles
(March
2007),
available
at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm. The drafters organized the Principles as
follows: Principles 1 to 3 address “the universality of human rights and their application to all
persons without discrimination, as well as the right of all people to recognition before the law;”
Principles 4-11 address “fundamental rights to life, freedom from violence and torture, privacy,
access to justice and freedom from arbitrary detention;” Principles 12-18 address “nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, including employment,
accommodation, social security, education and health;” Principles 19-21 address “the freedom to
express oneself, one’s identity and one’s sexuality, without State interference based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, including the rights to participate peaceably in public assemblies
and events and otherwise associate in community with others;” Principles 22-23 address “the
rights of persons to seek asylum from persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity;”
Principles 24-26 address “the rights of persons to participate in family life, public affairs and the
cultural life of their community, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity;” Principle 27 addresses “the right to defend and promote human rights without
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and the obligation of States to
ensure the protection of human rights defenders working in these areas;” Principle 28-29 affirm
“the importance of holding rights violators accountable, and ensuring appropriate redress for those
who face rights violations.” O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 288, at 234-35.
293
In the Preamble of the Principles, the drafters define both the terms “sexual orientation” and
“gender identity.” “Sexual orientation…refer[s] to each person’s capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender or the same gender or more than one gender.” Preamble, The Yogyakarta
Principles (March 2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm.
They go on to refine the definition of “gender identity”: Additionally, “gender identity…refer[s] to
each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not
correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may
involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or
other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.” Id.
294
O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 288, at 237. According to O’Flaherty, the drafters believed
they should recommend action points to other relevant actors who may protect and promote the
rights of sexual minorities. There are some 16 recommendations directed at international
governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as international rights and treaty
bodies, human rights institutions and commercial organizations.
295
While the Principles appear to have attracted attention from some international human rights
groups, there is a dearth of scholarship discussing the Principles, their relevance, and their impact.
That said, discussion and debate of the Principles is increasing. For example, in June of this year,
the Organization of American States (“OAS”) unanimously adopted a resolution condemning

44

UNSEX CEDAW
©Darren Rosenblum
Do not quote, cite or circulate without permission.

and fail to address specific remedies,296 including, notably, avoiding dealing with
the issue of same-sex marriage, instead opting in Principle 24 for a “right to found
a family.”297
Although one may fear that such rights efforts may fail to achieve more
than the backlash they provoke,298 or may fail to garner substantial international
human rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity. OAS Adopts Resolution to
Protect
Sexual
Rights,
Human
Rights
Watch,
June
6,
2008,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/colomb19049_txt.htm. The Brazil-sponsored resolution
takes note of the importance of the adoption of the Principles. Id. Also, at the United Nations
Department of Public Information/Non-Governmental Organization (“DPI/NGO”) 61st Annual
Conference—“Reaffirming Human Rights for All”—the Principles were discussed in a workshop.
DPI/NGO Homepage, http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/index.asp. Some scholars from an array
of disciplines have begun to incorporate references to the Principles in their work; however, the
legal community’s scholarship has not yet treated the Principles, save in the two references
discussed infra. The Rapporteur for the conference that produced the Principles has attempted to
catalogue if and how the Principles have impacted international human rights law. See O’Flaherty
& Fisher, supra note 288, at 237-47. According to O’Flaherty, several States have cited the
Principles, and have described the Principles as “‘groundbreaking’” and “as articulating ‘legally–
binding international standards that all States must respect.’” Id. at 238-39. O’Flaherty also
reports that the first legal citation to the Principles appears in a brief to the Nepal Supreme Court.
Id. at 246. The brief, submitted by the International Commission of Jurists, employs the
Principles’ definition of “gender identity” and argues that the Principles represent an international
consensus that “surgical modification is not a prerequisite for legal protection from discrimination
based on gender identity. Id.; International Commission of Jurists, Submissions to the Supreme
Court of The State of Nepal, Providing the Basis in International Human Rights Law for the
Prohibition of Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and Other
Connected Matters, available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/ICJ_Nepal_Supreme_Court_Brief.pdf at
paras. 4-5.
296
O’Flaherty also argues that while the experts achieved the goal of capturing the existing state of
international law, in some areas, the Principles fall short. O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 288, at
235. Other critiques include that some of the Principles are “vague and non-prescriptive” and that
the Principles do not comprehensively address particular fact circumstances, like access to
medicine in underdeveloped countries and same-sex domestic violence. Id. at 236.
297
Id. Principle 24, The Yogyakarta Principles (March 2007), available at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm. Principle 24 also admonishes States that
already recognize same marriage to “take all necessary legislative, administrative and other
measures to ensure…any entitlement, privilege, obligation or benefit available to different-sex
married or registered partners is equally available to same-sex married or registered partners.” Id.
298
Emma Mittelstaedt, Comment, Safeguarding the Rights of Sexual Minorities: The Incremental
and Legal Approaches to Enforcing International Human Rights Obligations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L.
353, 365-66, 384 (2008). According to Mittelstaedt, holding signatories accountable to uphold
their obligations under treaties onto which they have signed actually results in anti-GLBT
legislation in some signatory States. Id. at 384-85. The author cites Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria,
South Korea and Guatemala as examples of countries that have signed on to some international
agreement that theoretically protects the rights of sexual minorities. The author advocates “an
incremental approach to human rights” by the international community, which “would better serve
the aims of improving LGBT rights worldwide.” Id. at 385. Because the Principles have not yet
been adopted by any State, Mittelstaedt offers no hypothesis as to how the Principles might be
received by any of the countries she includes as scenarios where the international community
pushed too hard for the rights of sexual minorities. See id. The author does correctly point out,
though, that the Principles emphasize not only the responsibilities of States, but also the
responsibilities of the media, human rights institutions, NGOs and financial supporters. Id. at 366.
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support, the Principles do reflect a potential solution to the bind in which
CEDAW sits, where the centrality of “women” may hamper progress on issues of
gender and sexuality rights.
In sum, the establishment of “discrimination” and “women’s human
rights” confronts substantial theoretical and practical challenges in the centrality
of group identity. “Gender” and “sex” would both improve the debate by shifting
away from thinking about these issues as ones that solely affect the group known
as “women” who are positioned as “victims” of “discrimination.” The women’s
human rights movement as it now stands has caused some isolation of its
concerns, instead of placing women at the center of human rights debate. One
answer may involve shifting from an identity-centered treaty toward a rightsbased treaty, as embodied in CERD or the Yogyakarta Principles. CEDAW’s
error is confirmed when contrasted with CERD, which more effectively shapes
the discussion of race-related human rights issues.
IV.

Include All Sexes

As much as advocates may hesitate to move away from the sole focus on
women, gender balance cannot advance until that shift occurs. Women’s ordeals
still matter, but ignoring men and the broader, gendered power disparities does a
disservice to CEDAW’s goals of gender equality. Remedies for inequality solely
based on group identity will not rectify sexist policies. Presenting the problem as
one of discrimination, CEDAW presumes that those who are not women, i.e.,
men, are the perpetrators of this discrimination. This binarist construction of
gender inequality erroneously presumes a universe of two genders, but excludes
men from the diagnosis and the remedy to gender oppression. It frames men as
wrongdoers and women as innocent victims, devoid of agency.
The use of “women” instead of “sex” or “gender” has hobbled the treaty’s
efficacy at the international level. It has led to the insistence on Otto’s female
subjectivities instead of a full range of women. These subjectivities center on
constructing women as victims and reifying the binarism between “men” and
“women.”
CEDAW presumes that identity is the true marker of status for protection
under its mandates. Yet this same clarity also surfaces to link women with a
victim status. As other scholars have noted, the international women’s rights
movement has reinforced the image of the woman as a victim subject, primarily
through its focus on violence against women.299 This argument is a strong one,
but it does not go far enough: it is not simply “international law efforts” that
portray women as victims; it is the very language of the principal women’s rights
treaty. CEDAW sits at the core of such international law efforts, painting women

Although she includes no particular examples, Mittelstaedt states that “[t]he Principles…reveal a
trend toward utilizing nonstate actors to impose international law and norms upon unwilling, or at
least resistant, nations.” (emphasis added) Id.
299
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, supra note 163.
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as victims, subject to a wide array of discriminatory practices. Singling out
“women” for the protections of the Convention implies victim status.
A.

Trans-ing International Law

As Part II conveys, CEDAW’s reliance on “women” supports the
construction of humanity as a binary of two sexes. One’s gender identity may
defy simple categorization due to biology – there are many biological factors that
constitute “sex”300 – or by intent to change one’s identity.301 Some would even
argue that there are as many genders as there are people.302
Beyond the blurred divide between “men” and “women,”303 and the reality
that sex exists on a continuum, 304 transgender rights advocates have demanded
the legal recognition of the multiplicity of gender identity.305 Transgender rights
300

See Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing, supra note 139, at 504; see, e.g., Ehrenreich & Barr,
supra note 141. In the mid-1990s an intersex rights movement began to form. Intersex Society of
North
America,
What’s
the
History
Behind
the
Intersex
Movement,
http://www.isna.org/faq/history. Taking inspiration from the successes of feminists and gay rights
activists, the intersex movement sought similar reforms and an open discussion of the issues that
intersex people confront in a world where gender identity exists as a binary. Id. A central concern
of the movement is its effort to transform the method of treatment for babies born intersex. Id.
Intersex comes in a multitude of shapes and forms, both visible and non-visible, but throughout
the 20th century, the treatment and surgical techniques were devised with the goal of maintaining a
world with two separate sexes --- male and female. Id. The medicalization of the intersex
condition made it easy for parents and doctors to avoid grappling with the much more challenging
issue of the child’s gender identity. Id. Today, the movement calls on doctors and parents to deal
with the health concerns that some intersex babies face at birth while postponing ‘genital
normalizing’ surgery until the patient is older. This allows patients to consent before performing a
surgery that may be at odds with the their gender identity. Id. The movement wants people to be
aware of and understand the intersex condition so that society stops trying to “make it disappear”
and instead starts trying to ensure that these individuals may live prosperous lives with a stable
gender identity. Id.
301
Many transgender people transition from one gender to another, with or without medical
assistance, without the purpose of “passing” as the other gender. See generally BORNSTEIN, supra
note 142, at 65-69.
302
See STOLTENBERG, supra note 145, at 28. The failure to recognize this diversity is a particular
failing of this culture. Cultures from Ancient Greece to India, as well as various others around the
world, recognized the existence of hermaphrodite, or inter-sex, individuals and cross-gender
identified individuals without forcing them into either of the male or female genders. See LESLIE
FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS 39-47 (1996).
303
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 1595 (defining sex as “either of the two
divisions, designated female and male, of this classification”).
304
See Douglas, supra note 146, at 972; see also Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing, supra note
139, at 504. Fifteen years later, the New York Supreme Court of New York County used the exact
formulation cited above in Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
(holding that a pre-operative transgendered female was protected by New York City’s sex
discrimination statute as a member of the class of males).
305
In August of 1992, the International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy
(ICTLEP) set out to draft a “Gender Bill of Rights”. Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill
of Gender Rights, in TRANSGENDER LAW 327 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). The following
August, the Conference presented a first draft that they proceeded to revise and amend at the
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advocates assert an absolute right to gender identity, in which individuals can
choose a gender identity that reflects that individual’s self-understanding.306
The focus on “women” in CEDAW leaves transgender individuals in the
difficult position of questionable international law subjectivity. Is a man who
becomes a woman a “woman” for the purposes of CEDAW? What about a
woman who becomes a man? As with all juridical constructs, the sex binary
legitimizes certain acts and identities while delegitimizing others, generally
leaving out transgender individuals.307 CEDAW’s exclusion of multiple sexes has
serious consequences. Transgender individuals lack the social position ascribed
to “men” in the sex binary and lack recourse to the remedies promulgated by
CEDAW.
Transnational law is distinct from international law.308 International law
reflects agreements and responsibilities between states, whereas transnational law
reflects a broader set of legal interactions, involving states, non-state actors, and
the interaction between domestic legal structures and international ones. It
reflects a cosmopolitan goal of fostering interactions and even harmonization
among legal systems.
As transnational law advocates push for thinking about international law
in more complex ways, CEDAW, as the international law dealing with women,
sex and gender, should be “trans-ed.” It should include all sexes, even those who
fall outside of the sex binary. Numerically, however, the largest sex identity
excluded by CEDAW is men.
following three annual meetings. Id. The product purports to enumerate a set of universal civil
and human rights that if honored will all persons’ gender identity without regard to “chromosomal
sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role.” Id. On its own the Bill is without the
force of law, recently however, local governments peppered across the United States have begun
to recognize some of the rights as have foreign governments including Canada, South Africa,
Australia, Great Britain, and other Western European countries.
306
Id.
307
See EQUAL AND INDIVISIBLE, supra note 284.
308
Transnational law represents a hybrid of domestic and international law. See Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 745, 745 (2006). In 1956, Judge
Philip Jessup famously defined the term in his Storrs Lectures at Yale as “all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers . . . [including] [b]oth public and private
international law . . . [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.” Id.
(quoting Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law 2 (1956)). While the definition is still applicable
today, Koh has expounded on the term in his analyses on transnational legal process. According to
Koh, transnational law encompasses all laws that are not purely domestic or purely international
law. See id. His operational definition consists of 1) laws that are “downloaded” from international
to domestic law; 2) laws that are “uploaded” from domestic to international law, then
“downloaded” back to domestic law; and 3) laws that are borrowed or “horizontally transplanted”
from one national system to another. See id at 745-746. Not surprisingly, transnational law has
become increasingly significant to our lives given the globalized nature of law and legal studies.
Id. at 746. This prominence is reflected in transnational legal process, in which public and private
actors, including nation states, corporations, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and individuals, interact in a variety of fora to interpret, enforce, and ultimately
internalize, rules of international law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75
NEB. L. REV. 181, 183 (1996). The key elements of this approach are interaction, interpretation,
and internalization. Id.

48

UNSEX CEDAW
©Darren Rosenblum
Do not quote, cite or circulate without permission.

B.

Include Men

CEDAW should reference all genders. And if CEDAW errs in solely
referencing “women,” a large part of its error is the exclusion of men. During the
1989 bicentennial of France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man, feminists
questioned the textual exclusion from the Declaration of women by covering
posters around France with the words “and women.” It is equally appropriate to
ask the reverse of the question with respect to CEDAW: why focus solely on
women when gender inequality afflicts people of all genders?309 Although men
benefit in terms of wealth and power from their “insider” status, men also suffer
from gender inequality by the constraints of rigid gender norms. To eliminate
discrimination against women, men must be included in the design and
implementation of remedies. Men must be allies in a battle on gender inequality,
and without men, broader goals for gender equality will remain unrealized.
1.

Men in CEDAW

CEDAW’s title and text generally center on women, to the exclusion of
men. CEDAW includes men in certain contexts, but largely as a reference point
for the ideal of equality between men and women. Article 1 defines equality
between men and women as a basis for its antidiscrimination norms.310
Subsequent articles continue to reference men in this fashion. For example,
Article 7 guarantees access to participate in political life “on equal terms with
men.”311 Article 8 uses the same language.312 Article 9 guarantees women “equal
rights with men” to self-determination over nationality.313 The language of
Article 10 typifies CEDAW’s use of language: “States Parties shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to
ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women….”314
Men here serve as a yardstick, as CEDAW seeks “equal rights with men,”
“on a basis of equality of men and women,” and it is against this yardstick that the
core, formal-equality chunks of CEDAW measure women’s progress.315 Dianne
Otto’s female subjectivity of formal equality only exists in comparison with men.
As men play the yardstick, they also play the foil in CEDAW’s text.
CEDAW’s description is strikingly similar to John Grey’s portrayal of “men” and
309

Here I build on two works regarding men’s relationship to feminism. Nancy Levit, Feminism
For Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1038
(1996); PAUL NATHANSON & KATHERINE K. YOUNG, LEGALIZING MISANDRY: FROM PUBLIC
SHAME TO SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEN (2006).
310
See United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Full Text of the Convention in
English, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm.
311
Id.
312
See id.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Otto, supra note 97.
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“women” in which “Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus,” – a portrait of
stark differences.316 In short, CEDAW’s emphasis on women, to the exclusion of
men, reifies the gendered nature of power, leaving men out of the equation both as
a subject of analysis and as a subject of rights, except insofar as their socioeconomic position can measure law’s (and, since CEDAW is the law, “women’s”)
success at combating sexism.
One element of CEDAW stands out from this obsessively identitarian text.
Article 5(a) appears to reference men toward a different end – the elimination of
sexist and stereotyped roles for either men or women. Article 5(a) seeks to
“modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view of achieving the elimination of prejudices and customs which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women.”317 Article 5(a) recognizes that men and women play a
role in the practices that perpetuate gender discrimination. Thus, in Article 5(a),
the drafters of CEDAW seemed to have expanded the scope of the treaty language
to include practices by both genders. This particular language suggests
protections for men – the treaty calls for the elimination of “practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes.”318 The
inclusion of men and acknowledgment of women’s roles in patterns of conduct
represent a break with the language of other sections of the treaty focusing
particularly on women.
CEDAW’s problem is that the reference to men in Article 5(a) is an
isolated one, raising the question of why the drafters chose to include men in this
one section but not elsewhere. Their exclusion elsewhere raises the question of
whether it was consistent to include them in this one section. Seeking solutions
involving only women fails to account for the complex issues that go well beyond
group identity - issues that deal with the fundamental set of power relations that
define all societies and states in the international system, in which subordination
based on gender constitutes the norm for political, economic and familial
institutions. Given that CEDAW’s reference in Article 5(a) stands as a limited
intervention toward thinking about gender beyond “women,” we can safely
conclude that CEDAW is largely silent on how international law should govern
gender issues as they relate to men, except insofar as it seeks to limit men’s
dominance in public power.
CEDAW’s flawed discussion of men is echoed in subsequent feminist
international efforts that reflect an even deeper ambivalence toward the
recognition of male suffering from gender imbalances.

316

JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (HarperCollins 1992).
Andrea Vesa, International and Regional Standards For Protecting Victims of Domestic
Violence, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y AND L. 309, 328 (2004).
318
Id.
317
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2.

Masculinity’s Harm to Men

Readers attuned to the ravages of sexism on women may exclaim “cry me
a river,” dismissing men’s suffering. Some may argue that limiting men’s
oversized role in public power is, in itself, sufficient as an aspiration for men. Yet
men too suffer from gender inequality. Men may obtain more responsibility in
society, along with more money, but these benefits come with the cost of reduced
family and leisure time.319 In certain vocations, men are placed on the frontlines
in battle and down in the mines, exposed to physical danger.320
Beyond the fact that men deserve attention for gender inequality, an
element to be addressed, recent feminist international interventions point toward a
presumption that these issues are secondary. Janet Halley’s recent studies of
feminist interventions in international criminal law demonstrate something is
amiss. In her Rape at Rome article, she criticizes feminist internationalists for
overstepping feminist norms in their zealotry during the negotiations over the
International Criminal Court. 321 The feminist consensus on international criminal
law that came out of these efforts represented not a middle ground between
conservative and leftist feminist ideologies but rather a firmly structuralist
approach that conceived international criminal law in terms of male domination
and female subordination.322 Halley, as referenced in Part II, calls this
“Governance Feminism” or GFeminism. Its proponents, GFeminists, achieved
remarkable success (particularly for feminists) in creating a “near-seamless
consensus” that pervades scholarly and popular writing in this area.
Although Halley recognizes some value in the recognition of rape as a war
crime in certain contexts,323 Halley questions whether the Gfeminists’
intervention was good for men, women, and international criminal law.324 For
example, GFeminists did not settle for the Geneva Convention’s classification of
rape as a crime against humanity: they “did not want women’s physical integrity
to be a subset of universal human integrity.”325 Instead, they believed that a
woman’s right to be free from sexual assault was “universal in scope,” and that
this right should not be shared with men, but established as a separate

319

See Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: How the Family and Medical Leave Act
Perpetuates Sex Inequality Across All Levels, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 430 (2007)
(addressing the difficulty dads in America face as they attempt to strike a balance between their
work and their families); see also Nancy Gibbs, Viewpoint: Bring on the Daddy Wars, TIME, Feb.
27, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1168125,00.html (reporting
on the need for greater recognition of the plight of fathers in the national work family debate).
320
See, e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries by Selected Worker
Characteristics
and
Selected
Event
or
Exposure,
2007,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t04.htm (showing that men account for 92% of occupational
fatalities).
321
See Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note 78.
322
Id. at 3.
323
Id. at 123.
324
Id. at 4.
325
Id. at 67.
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protection.326 Some GFeminists argued that sexual assault should sit alongside the
worst international criminal law violations of crimes against humanity and
genocide.327 The Rome statute adopted this idea: persecution based on gender,
including rape, is a crime against humanity.328 The recourse to criminal law on
the international stage is one fraught with complications.
GFeminists failed in their attempt to include gender violence, including
the gendered social constructs that support male dominance, in the list of sexual
offenses.329 This reform was yet another effort to regulate everyday sexism even
when not related to armed conflict.330 One compelling example Halley notes is
the issue of child soldiers, most of whom are boys. Their reasoning for objecting
to child soldiers is that trauma to boys ratifies patriarchal values, and thus harms
women.331 Halley points out that this reasoning fosters an indifference to the
suffering of men.
Others go further than Halley in condemning feminist efforts as damaging
to men. Paul Nathanson and Katherine Young argue that ideological feminist332
efforts have succeeded in replacing a male-dominated legal structure with one that
favors women at men’s expense, replacing discrimination against women with a
legislated double standard against men.333 They describe this force as misandry,
“the idea that men can be classified only as evil or inadequate, or as honorary
women.”334 In this gynocentric worldview, women’s membership in a victim

326

Id. at 167.
Id. at 123 (citing Samantha I. Ryan, From the Furies of Nanking to the Eumenides of the
International Criminal Court: The Evolution of Sexual Assaults as International Crime, 11 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 447, 450 (1999)).
328
One FU advocate suggests that “every rape is an expression of male domination and female
subordination and thus a persecution on the basis of gender.” Id. (quoting Rhonda Copelon,
Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in Times of War, in MASS RAPE:
THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZGOVINIA 212-213 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., Marion
Faber trans., 1994). Halley vehemently disagrees with advocates of FU and their attempts to frame
an armed conflict like the war in the Balkans as a “war-against-women.” Id.
329
See id. at 83.
330
Id. at 84.
331
Id. at 85. Feminist Universalism does not recognize masculinity in itself as a “site of harm.” Id.
at 86. Halley explains why such a concession would be antithetical to the FU vision as it would
“relinquish not the commitment to seeing domination in sexuality and gender, but the commitment
to seeing that domination as structurally committed to male domination and female
subordination.” Id.
332
As Nathanson and Young use the term, “ideological feminism” means the dualistic world-view
that characterizes woman as victims and men as oppressors. The authors also list the following as
characteristic features of ideological feminism: essentialism-the emphasis on the unique qualities
of women; hierarchy-indirect or direct suggestion that women are superior to men; collectivismthe communal goals of women outweigh the rights of individual men; utopianism-establishing an
ideal social order in history; selective cynicism-systematic suspicion directed only toward men;
revolutionism-political agenda that supersedes reform; consequentialism-the idea that the ends
justify the means; and quasi-religiosity-a secular religion created. NATHANSON & YOUNG, supra
note 309.
333
Id. at 264.
334
Id. at xiii.
327
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class situates men as “collectively guilty.”335 Nathanson and Young state that
“[d]iscrimination against men is by now so pervasively institutionalized that it is
best described as systemic and characteristic of the legal system as a whole.336
This systemic shift has occurred in courts, classrooms and at the international
level.337
Within the international context, CEDAW, as well as the Beijing Platform
for Action and a special annex to the Declaration and the Platform most clearly
exemplify legalized misandry. Nathanson and Young point to the elision of
human rights into women’s rights. They criticize efforts to delete references to
human rights, and convert discussion of women’s needs into rights assertions.338
The authors sum up these documents as forcing a complete destruction of cultural
differences in favor of a feminist conformity with an ideological vision of
utopia.”339
335

Id. at xi.
Id. Nathanson and Young argue that the legal system, through the participation of the media,
has fostered a radical shift in the perception of men. The authors argue that the media has placed
men on public trial by its coverage of heinous male-on-female violent crimes, of sexual
harassment cases, and of male-child sexual abuse cases. By highlighting four particular
incidents—a California child sex abuse/Satan worship case, the Lorena Bobbitt incident, the Anita
Hill/Clarence Thomas scandal, and the “Montreal Massacre” on a Canadian College Campus—
Nathanson and Young support their thesis that ideological feminists view the class of males as
oppressors and women (and children) as a class as victims. They note the role psychologists,
therapists, psychiatrists and other clinicians played in each of the aforementioned scenarios. In
each case, according to the authors, ideological feminists used the media’s, along with a host of
“experts,” coverage of bizarre, even grotesque, events to support their own claims that male
biology was evil. Other feminists utilized these incidents as a backdrop for their own theses that
such instances of wrongdoing merely demonstrated the result of masculine socialization. By the
end of these “public trials,” Nathanson and Young argue that the accused in each case were
portrayed to represent the entire class of men and that even where courts had decided otherwise,
the verdict against these men—against all men—was guilty. Id. at 315.
337
Ideological feminist efforts have succeeded in positioning women’s rights as superior to the
rights of men. Nathanson and Young cite examples from both Canada and from the United States,
and do so “[b]ecause both countries have been heavily influenced in the recent past by a common
worldview promoted by the United Nations. Based either explicitly or implicitly on
postcolonialism, the international version of postmodernism, it is highly receptive to …
ideological feminism.” Id. at 80.
338
Id. at 393-94. Interestingly, the authors point to the dominance of Western feminists as a key
factor in the support for these ideological feminist assertions. Nathanson and Young also note the
lack of participation in the debate by non-Western delegates. The authors suggest that these nonWestern feminists view Western ideological feminism as the “newest form of Western
imperialism.” Id. at 395. They take the argument further, writing that ideological feminism is a
secular religion, functioning as a rival to traditional religions. As Nathanson and Young see it,
one of the ideological feminists’ ultimate goals is to eliminate all traditional religions, which
would also lead to disappearance of the cultures associated with those religions. Id. at 395.
339
Id. at 501-2. Some notable examples of language include: the Annex urges countries to develop
“policies and implement programmes, particularly for men and boys, on changing stereotypical
attitudes and behaviours concerning gender roles and responsibilities to promote gender equality
and positive attitudes and behaviour,” id.; failure to define the term “gender,” but nonetheless
using the term in a gynocentric manner (as opposed to “gender” referring to both males and
females), id. at 397; inclusion in the Annex of the term “herstory” to refer to historical and
336
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Although these authors muster some evidence to support their assertions,
they deliberately overstate the case for dramatic effect. To take one example,
affirmative action and quotas, it is difficult to argue that a quota that provides for
political representation for women subjugates men when they constitute 85% of
public officials in most democracies. Halley provides a less overreaching
assertion that certain feminist engagements threaten to devalue men. Nations that
follow CEDAW may weaken men’s social position, but not to the extent that it
would institute some purely gynocentric governance. Here, Halley’s argument
centers on the ethical problems of using a coercive prosecution model to pursue
women’s rights.340 The principal problem with the extent to which CEDAW and
other feminist international efforts look at men is the way in which these
considerations ground the shift in terms of what would prevent violence against
women. Although that is a worthy goal, bringing men into sex or gender equality
efforts will require a more direct engagement of their issues.
3.

Men’s Potential Contribution toward Gender Equality

Men do perpetuate gender inequality, but they are by no means the only
actors, and women are not the only victims. Sexism also oppresses men, and to
eliminate discrimination, men must be included in the design and implementation
of remedies.341 CEDAW’s title and text should utilize language that includes
men.
contemporary perspective from a female point of view, id. at 397; inclusion of the term
“empowerment” where the implication is that only men hold power and only women lack it, id.;
the suggestion that families depend primarily on the support of the mother, id. at 399; the
implication that families headed by lesbians or by single mothers benefit children as much as a
family headed by a mother and a father, id.; the treatment of poverty and tyranny as symptoms of
women’s suffering, not as causes, of violence against women and of trafficking, id.; the rhetorical
suggestion that the rights of women and girls are either not covered by human rights, or that the
rights of men and boys simply do not matter, id.; and endorsing quotas and affirmative action as
means to achieve gender balance. Id. at 400.
340
In addition to Halley, others have argued the dangers of a prosecutorial model for women’s
rights efforts. See, e.g., John Valery White & Christopher L. Blakesley, Women Or Rights: How
Should Women’s Rights Be Conceived And Implemented?, in WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 51, 60 (Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., 1999). The authors extol the
virtues of the probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as well as other rights
of the accused. They discuss the tenuous balance of protecting the rights of victims and the
accused, and continually assert that “eroding protections for the accused will ultimately have the
effect of eroding all human rights.” Id. at 68.
341
This sexism extends well beyond the same-sex sexual harassment of Oncale. See Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment, in
this case harassment of a male worker on an oil rig in the ocean, may constitute sex
discrimination). Men’s suffering is invisible to CEDAW. Although feminist international efforts
have focused largely on female victims of rape in the context of war, male rape has become a
powerful and increasingly common weapon of war in the Congo. Jeffrey Gettleman, Symbol of
Unhealed Congo: Male Rape Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/africa/05congo.html.
The
American
Bar
Association’s sexual violence clinic in Goma has male victims in over ten percent of its cases.
Although male rape cases still happen considerably less frequently than female rape, aid workers
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These arguments have played a large role in public debates over gender
equality in Scandinavia, both within feminist circles and in government
policies.342 Within U.S. feminist circles, the most persuasive theorist on these
issues is Nancy Levit, who articulated a role for men in feminism in a positive
fashion. In Feminism For Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of
Maleness, Levit notes the extent to which legal scholarship falls short of other
disciplines in understanding the role of men and masculinity. The extent to which
men suffer from male stereotypes has been addressed by legal scholars, but
largely in an incidental fashion. Feminist legal theory, Levit asserts, has omitted
men “as participants in the reconstructive project.”343 Her goal is to focus on
relational justice in which men are “invited into the discourse.”344 Levit argues
that “it is not only possible for men to become feminists, but imperative that they
do.”
Exploring how patriarchy harms men, Levit hopes to enlist men in the
feminist fight against it.”345 Legal doctrine perpetuates harmful stereotypes of
men,346 such as the requirement that they suffer in silence and reserve their
emotions. This silencing of male victims isolates men who suffer from sexual
violence and harassment.347
Although Levit agrees with feminists’ assessments that men’s experiences
are considered the “norm,” she asks “who is the generic man that typifies the
norm…”348 The radical feminist method of consciousness-raising, Levit argues,
should be put to use to “test the ways in which society has relegated men to
in Congo suggest that men have a more difficult time recovering from these attacks. Id. Indeed,
the humiliation is often so severe that men only seek medical attention if their injuries are severe,
like stomach swelling, continuous bleeding, or even castration. Id. In fact, two men whose penises
were cinched with rope died because they were too embarrassed to seek help. Id. Male rape is a
problem in many societies, from prison rape in the United States to sexual violence in places like
Dubai. See, e.g., National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report, June 23, 2009, available
at http://nprec.us/publication/ (last visited August 21, 2009). In one notable case, a French
15-year-old was raped by an acquaintance and his friends after they offered to give him a ride
home. Thanassis Cambanis, In Rape Case, a French Youth Takes on Dubai, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/world/middleeast/01dubai.html.
Although Alex and his family went to the authorities, the police were unwilling to help, and
threatened to charge him with criminal homosexual activity if he persisted, reflecting cultural
norms that prevent men from presenting themselves as victims. Id.
342
See generally SCANDINAVIAN CRITIQUE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN FEMINIST THEOLOGY (Hanna
Stenstrom et al. eds., 2007).
343
Levit, supra note 309, at 1038.
344
Id.
345
Id. at 1040. After a lengthy survey of several strands of feminist theory (liberal, cultural, radical
and postmodern), and how they have all either vilified or omitted men from their discourses, Levit
expresses her concern that “men have no history as gendered selves” because “no work describes
historical events in terms of what these events meant to the men who participated in them as men.”
Within legal theory, there is also a severe dearth of scholarship exploring legal conceptions of
masculinity and how they affect both genders. Id.
346
Id.
347
Id. at 1063.
348
Id. at 1089.
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stereotypically male roles,” although the groups should be composed of both
genders.349 This point leads to Levit’s conclusion. Feminists must pay heed to
society’s treatment of men: “stereotyping harms to one gender also rigidify role
expectations of the other gender.”350 Parenting is a perfect example of the
negative effects of this rigidity.
4.

A Concrete Example: Parental Leave

An example surfaces in recent social science literature as crucial to gender
equality efforts: parental leave.351 Public norms over women’s ability to choose
to work or stay at home have shifted over the past few decades.352 Stereotypes of
men dictate that men are not suited to family and caretaking roles, which is played
out in the fact that women can take parental leave more readily then men and men
are often discounted from receiving custody of their children.353 This male
stereotype harms women as well as men, by acting as an “impediment to the equal
division of childcare responsibilities.”354 Empirical studies of parental leave
reflect this reality. On their face, policies providing parental leave for women
benefit individual women. Economists point out, though, that such policies make
women employees more expensive than men employees, leading to the hiring of
fewer women and reinforcing sexist norms of work and income.355 Men, product
of stereotyping, tend to only take parental leave when forced to do so, out of fear
that they will be perceived in the workplace as inattentive toward work issues.
Taking the United States’ Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as an
example, it requires up to twelve weeks of unpaid time off for so-called parental
leave.356 One of the purposes of passing FMLA was to further the position of
349

Id.
Id. at 1112.
351
Another example reflects the potential role of men in gender equality: female genital cutting
(“FGC”). This example is at once more controversial and less prominent in recent social science
literature. FGC served as one of most critical and divisive issues in the international women’s
movement. See Ehrenreich, supra note 141; see also Obiora, supra note 86. Often overlooked in
this debate is the extent to which discussion of the issue as a women’s issue is self defeating
because it leaves men out of the solution. Eliminating the practice involves finding ways to
restrict the practice or reduce the harms resulting from the practice. One core component of this
solution involves convincing men to accept a wife who has not undergone the procedure. For
example, the wife of Egyptian President Mubarak, Suzanne Mubarak, plays a significant role in
making the public aware of the dangers of female genital circumcision. See ELIZABETH HEGER
BOYLE, FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING: CULTURAL CONFLICT IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 105
(2005).
352
See generally LINDA HIRSCHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN (2006).
Although Hirschman describes a shift away from women’s ability to choose to work, even she
would agree substantial progress has occurred.
353
Levit, supra note 309, at 1073.
354
Id. at 1074.
355
In this sense, the stereotypes reinforce men’s financial advantage over women. Their benefit
from this stereotype does not, however, ameliorate the cost of not having time with their families.
356
Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not Taking Paternity Leave Under
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 258 (2003).
350
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women in the workplace.357 Although the statute employed gender-neutral
language, men take less advantage of the parental leave benefits. Private
corporate initiatives may suggest that male paternity leave is on the rise,358 data
collected from surveys suggest otherwise.
Women take far more parental leave than men. Rather than relying on
FMLA or company paternity leave policies, the men who took family leave relied
primarily on their vacation time (average of ten days).359 Halverson argues that
the reason men do not rely on the FMLA for paternity leave is based on five
obstacles: (1) paternity leave is still stigmatizing in the workplace, (2) most men
cannot afford to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave, (3) many men do not realize
that the FMLA covers paternity leave, (4) the FMLA places an administrative
burden on employers hence creating obstacles for men taking FMLA paternity
leave, and (5) the Act was not created to further the cause of fathers who want to
bond with their newborns.360
The basic premise of the stigma in taking paternity leave is because
society views men as breadwinners and women as caregivers and that “men are
less attached to their children.” 361 Hence, “parenthood remains a highly gendered
concept in our culture.” These gender stereotypes attribute to the low number of
male leave takers despite the Act’s gender-neutral language. For newborn child
care “men receive subtle messages from employers that their place is at the office
and their wives’ responsibility is child care.”362 In fact, many law firms require
that male employees meet the “primarily caregiver” benchmark prior to taking a
paid paternity leave. In sum, there is a double standard because successful
working women are perceived as bad mothers while male are successful fathers
only if there are successful at work.363
On the other hand, “men of the younger generation ‘seem far less
burdened by the macho [and incompetent dad] stereotypes . . . than their
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Id.
For example, Ernst & Young created an internal campaign in 2006, featuring senior manager
Rob McLeod, 32, speaking enthusiastically about his experience when he took four weeks of
paternity leave. The purpose of this campaign was to help men feel more comfortable taking
advantage of family-friendly benefits. Karen Holt, Good for the Gander, WORKING MOTHER,
Aug.
22,
2009,
available
at
http://www.workingmother.com/web?service=direct/1/ViewAdvancedPortalPage/PortalBlocks/dli
nkArticle&sp=S1667&sp=94.
359
The 2000 U.S. Department of Labor (DoL) statistics showed that only 13.5% of male and
19.8% of female employees took family leave. Halverson, supra note 356, at 259. Moreover, the
same survey showed that women comprised 58.1% of leave takers in general and were more likely
than men to take the leave. The survey was conducted over five years and the trend showed that
the percentage of overall male leave takers in general declined by almost two percent (43.8% to
41.9%) while women leave takers increased by the same increment (56.2% to 58.1%). Id. at 260261.
360
Id. at 258.
361
Id. at 262.
362
Id.
363
Id. at 263.
358
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predecessors.’”364 The expectations of younger males are changing and a strong
paternity leave policy may help recruit male employees. Even if this is the case,
the persistence of norms by which men do not take paternity leave will continue
in practice given the sharp disparities between men and women taking family
leave.
One study points to factors that demonstrate that the gender gap should
have disappeared but for the parental responsibilities of women.365 The
consideration of these offsetting factors creates a self-perpetuating mechanism - if
employers believe that women are mostly responsible for household work, then
they expect women to put less time and effort into their jobs and hence offer them
lower jobs and earnings.366 As a result, women assign more time for house
responsibilities because it is more financially efficient. Subsequently, there is a
slow decline of the gender gap in wages and home responsibilities even though
women no longer have a comparable advantage to stay home.
More generous maternal leave policies are counterproductive because such
policies reinforce a division of labor; they encourage women to stay home more
and work less. A model in which fathers’ paternity leave becomes mandatory
may be a good alternative. This Swedish model reduces gender asymmetries in
the allocation of parental responsibilities because its mandatory father’s leave
policy “decreases the potential for statistical discrimination that leads to gender
inequalities specifically in wages.”367 Sweden has a gender-neutral paternal leave
system that is a strong model of family policy. It is “widely regarded as the most
comprehensive” system that currently exists as it is based on the recognition that
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Id. at 264.
For example, Keith Cunningham argues that “work-life balance” is extremely important and
one of the determining factors for new associates in choosing a law firm. Keith Cunningham,
Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law Firm’s Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 967, 970 (2001). He proposes and argues the following:
“In any business setting, successful adoption of alternative work schedules will
only occur once clear support of the policies are given from upper management,
which in turn will lead to a critical mass of men using these programs. The
lesson to large firms is unmistakable: Having a family-friendly policy on paper
means nothing in an environment that fails to honor a man’s simultaneous
commitments as lawyer and father.”
Id. at 973. Albanesi & Olivetti wrote a commentary on researched-based policy analysis regarding
gender roles and technological progress. The commentary discusses that medical advances of the
twentieth century, particularly with regard to child-bearing, increased a fraction of a woman’s life
that could be devoted to the labor market. Based on the results of the quantitative analysis, they
predicted that the “labor force participation rate of married women should be the same as men’s
and that the gender wage gap should have virtually disappeared by 1970.” Id. However their
model did not account for various offsetting factors including presence of “marriage bars,” cultural
forces and women’s unique biological roles. See Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, Gender
Roles and Technological Progress, NBER WP 13179 (July 20, 2007), available at
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/402.
366
Id.
367
Id.
365
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the traditional family roles have changed.368 Two employed parents are entitled
to a combined eighteen months of parental leave. Either parent may use this
benefit in its entirety or apportion it. The first 390 days is paid at 80 % of a
normal salary - and the remaining 90 days at a flat fixed rate. To encourage
paternal involvement in child rearing, Sweden has a rule requiring three months
of that time allowance to be used by the father. The parents have the option to
return to work on a part-time basis until the child reaches eight.369
Rather than focusing on gender as the primary basis to receive the
benefits, the Swedish system focuses on the child’s ability to spend equal time
with both parents. As such, the Swedish gender-neutral system “alleviates
feminist concerns about disparate treatments involved with ‘maternity’ leave”
because it does not penalize women who desire both a career and children.370
However, in the early 1980s, there was an apparent reluctance and difficulty for
males to take parental leave primarily attributable to traditional sex roles. In order
to change the low social acceptability of paternity leave, the “Swedish feminists
proposed that the government mandate paternity leave.”371
By the early 1990s, “almost fifty percent of men with children took
paternity leave.”372 As more men took paternity leave, it became more socially
acceptable. Likewise, because paternal leave was socially acceptable, more men
subsequently took the leave.373 The model appears healthy and self-perpetuating
because it promotes social advancement and results in less hiring discrimination
because men and women take equal parental leave. Therefore, the Swedish
system is not only generous but it is highly effective in diminishing at work
discrimination based on gender and traditional parenting roles.
As the parental leave example demonstrates, laws that seek to ameliorate
women’s situation by focusing on women actually reinforce gender disparities.
Laws that address issues with attention to both men and women achieve more
success in improving women’s lives and decreasing gender disparities.
C.

Recognize Women’s Agency

This is not solely about including men; it’s also about recognizing women
who are not victims. As Third Wave Feminist theory has explored, feminism
must champion women’s agency to remain relevant.374 Women are not simply,
368

Michelle Ashamalla, A Swedish Lesson in Parental Leave Policy, 10 B.U. INT’L L.J. 241, 243
(1993).
369
Id.
370
Id. at 244.
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Id.
374
Third-Wave Feminism may be defined generationally as the brand of feminism created by
those who developed their political conscience in the 1980s and 1990s but also thematically as a
movement characterized by: (1) dissatisfaction with earlier feminists; (2) the multiple nature of
personal identity; (3) the joy of embracing traditional feminine appearance and attributes; (4) the
centrality of sexual pleasure and sexual self-awareness; (5) the obstacles to economic
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always, and irreducibly victims – they play a substantial role in the maintenance
of gender inequality. Again, think of female genital cutting, much of which is
committed by women on their daughters. In this and many more subtle ways,
women are complicit in our world of gender inequality.
Dianne Otto points to CEDAW’s reference to prostitution as an example
of the importance of the victim subject in CEDAW. The CEDAW provision
calling for the “suppression…of the exploitation of prostitution of women”
exemplifies the vulnerable female representation’s presence in the document.375
By not acknowledging women’s “right” to work as prostitutes, CEDAW
characterizes “…all prostitution as ‘exploitation,’” and all sex workers as
apparently in need of protection from those which exploit them.376 A genderbased treaty, recognizing both women’s agency and men’s non-enemy status,
would achieve far more than the CEDAW model has or could.
Positing that women are victims relies on the currency of essentialist
notions of both sex and culture in the international women’s human rights
arena.377 This element of the CEDAW critique draws on Ratna Kapur’s work on
the victim subject. First, she points to the problem in the presumption of a
coherent group identity even among different cultures. Kapur points to the
international law’s liberal discourse that overlooks multi-layered experiences that
take into account perspectives of class, race, religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual
orientation.378 This cultural essentialism, some have argued, has become
displaced onto a divide between the developed and the developing worlds.379
International women’s rights discourse has yet to find a full resolution of this
intersectionality critique.
Second, Kapur points to the problems with a focus on violence that
reinforces the depiction of women in developing countries as perpetually
marginalized. These cultural depictions often rely on tropes that ignore important

empowerment; and (6) the social and cultural impact of media and technology.” Crawford, supra
note 79.
375
Otto, supra note 97, at 118-19.
376
Id. at 119.
377
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, supra note 163, at 2. Essentialism is the fixing
of certain attributes to women that are assumed to be shared by all of them. Id. at 7. Experiences
of gender oppression cannot be extricated from experiences of racial oppression because they
simultaneously occur. Id. at 8.
378
Id.
379
Kapur argues in favor of transcending the victim subject and disrupting the cultural and gender
essentialism that now characterize feminist legal politics. Id. at 2-3. Western feminists often
perceive cultural practices in overly simplistic ways that presume broader mistreatment based on
different practices. The veil, for example, is assumed to be an oppressive and subordinating
practice that typifies Islam and its degrading treatment of women. Id. at 12. In The Politics of the
Veil, Scott argues that Western feminists critique Muslim women who wear the veil because the
French in general and French feminists in particular fail to understand different constructions of
sexuality. See SCOTT, supra note 114. Scott, like Kapur, rejects the concept of a feminist
universalism and argues in favor of interpreting women’s choices in their cultural context. See id.;
see also Sunder, supra note 115; Bennoune, supra note 112.
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parallels and distance other women based on cultural difference.380 As Lama Abu
Odeh adroitly notes, a crime of “passion” bears far more similarities to “honor”
killings than Western feminists care to admit.381 Western feminists react with
horror to the kerosene-laden deaths of women in the “East,” and advocate for
international legal intervention to protect these women victims.382
Simultaneously, international advocates leave protecting women from relationship
violence within their own countries to others. Kapur notes, as others have, that
such feminist interventions echo “imperial intervention in the lives of ‘backward’
native subjects.”383
I want to recognize the utility of this focus before extending Kapur’s
critique. Violence is a real problem – women do suffer extensive violence at the
hands of men. Violence, when framed in a transcultural fashion as Abu Odeh
does, can serve to unite feminists around the protection of women. Violence
served as the centerpiece of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women of Belem do Pará,
uniting countries with disparate norms around this goal.
Yet a violence-centered approach to women’s rights suffers from multiple
flaws. The violence against women agenda in some ways reifies cultural and
religious presumptions, both of non-Western cultures as primitive and of nonWestern women as needing to be saved by outsiders.384 Viewing these women as
victims creates an opposition to the Western subject, as was implicit in Laura
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Culture has been used as a way to explain the different violence against women in the postcolonial Third World. Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, supra note 163, at 13. But
cultural explanations reproduce the native subject of colonial discourse. Cultural explanations
neither challenge nor take control of the problem and they deflect attention from the broader and
more prevalent crime of domestic violence and the other reasons that women are abused or killed.
Instead of cultural explanations, there is a need for economic, social, and institutional analysis in
order to create better strategies. Id. at 16.
381
Abu Odeh uses a comparative method to critique “the legally sanctioned violence against
women (for intimate or sexual reasons), of both the Arab legal system and that of the American,
which, she argues, “reveals the fallacy of both the orientalist construction that the East is different
from the West.” Abu Odeh exposes the “deep similarities between the internal tensions within
each legal system as to what constitutes a killing of women that is legally tolerated (either fully or
partially), and that these tensions, although sometimes defined differently, have been surprisingly
resolved in the same way.” Odeh, supra note 98.
382
Jon Boone, Desperate Women Choose Death by Fire, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008.
383
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, supra note 163, at 2.
384
Id. This has reinforced the representation of Third World women as disempowered, brutalized,
and victimized. The image of the Third World woman is reminiscent of the colonial construction
of the Eastern woman who is sexually constrained, tradition-bound, incarcerated in the home,
illiterate and poor. The author critiques Kathleen Barry’s work on trafficking, in which Barry
argues that any woman who migrates to work in the sex trade is a victim of human rights
violations. Id. at 18 (citing KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979)). Barry’s
representation of the Third World woman infantilizes, assumes she is backward, incapable of
autonomy, and reproduces the colonialist rationale for intervening in the lives of the native
subject. Id. at 19. Barry draws no distinction regarding consent and non-consent in trafficking and
women who move are regarded as “victims.” These representations invite state responses that
perpetuate gender and cultural stereotypes. Id.
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Bush’s efforts to publicize the plight of Afghani women.385 This construction of
the victim subject risks denying women the agency that they demonstrate
throughout their lives.386 Though the victim subject provides a foundation for a
shared movement, the victim subject is ahistorical and reinforces imperialist
responses towards women in the developing world.387 As Kapur points out,
efforts to counter essentialism have been approached through the spectrum of
violence, which has reinforced cultural essentialism and the construction of the
Other as backward and uncivilized.388
Third world feminists deploy the victim narrative in different but perhaps
equally problematic ways.389 Some non-Western feminists engage in similar
tropes of essentialism, in the example Kapur uses, characterizing all “Indian”
women as a monolithic group.390 Violence against women thus serves as a site
for an alliance between Western and non-Western feminists, each of which use
the construction for legitimation of their goals in their pursuit for the recognition
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Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women’s Rights in the ‘War on Terrorism’, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 211, 219-20 (2002).
386
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, supra note 163, at 2.
387
Id. at 17.
388
Id.
389
Kapur notes the ways in which feminists have capitalized on nationalist sentiment to
distinguish themselves from Western feminists and thus advance their agenda domestically.
Using India as a post-colonial example, Kapur notes that nationalism and feminism have taken on
different meanings. Though the modern post-colonial Indian state continues to take an antiimperialist stance, nationalism is playing a conservative rather than a progressive role. Id. at 23.
With the rise of the Hindu Right and Hindu nationalism, some modern Indian feminists have
embraced nationalism and seek to distinguish themselves from Western feminism, which is
perceived as decadent. Id. at 24. Sometimes these efforts on the part of post-colonial feminists
contribute the construction of post-colonial women as victims. The field of sex work is an
example. Id. at 26. Feminists assume that choice is possible in the West, but not in Asia. Asian
women, perceived as chaste and vulnerable to exploitation, are set in opposition to the
promiscuous Western woman. Id. Thus, the discourse of feminists in this instance is embedded in
the idea of an authentic Indian subject and the construction of the woman in prostitution as a
victim of the market. The victim status conferred on women by some post colonial feminist
positions becomes indistinguishable from the discourse on the purity of the nation and the
preservation of Indian womanhood that characterized the Indian nationalist discourse in the early
twentieth century. Id.
390
The Indian feminists’ idea of an “authentic victim subject” (in the example of India) operates
under the assumption that Indian women are a monolithic victim group who are all similarly
oppressed, and that there is an essentialized Indian culture and Indian woman. Id. This position
has resulted in the exclusion of other subjugated identities and has set up Western culture against
non-Western culture. Id. at 27. The legitimizing of the Indian feminist position has demanded a
repudiation of Western feminism. The construction of the authentic victim subject position,
constantly in opposition to imperialism or the West, is critical to the legitimacy of Indian
feminism. Id. at 28. As noted in the sex worker example, the Indian subject is distinguished from
the West and the Western feminist through their position of victimization. Id. Thus the victim is
prioritized as the true symbol of Indian feminism and allows the Indian state to take a protectionist
role with regard to women. Id. The victim subject has become a de-contextualized, ahistorical
subject, disguised superficially as the dowry victim, as the victim of honor killings, or as the
victim of trafficking and prostitution. Id.
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of human rights.391 In the international arena, the victim subject may foster racist
perceptions of non-Western women.392 The victim subject disempowers women,
encouraging nation states to take on protectionist roles and morally regulate
women.393
Third, constructing women as the subjects for protection reinforces state
paternalism that often takes a conservative form. One example is restrictions of
women working at night;394 another is Renu Mandhane’s example of Nepal’s
restriction on women’s movement without male guardians.395 As Kapur states,
“[r]eforms are used to justify state restrictions on women’s rights in the name of
the protection of women.396 The creation and reinforcement of a victim subject
has not empowered women and may be a setback to the broader recognition of
women’s human rights.397
Kapur proposes a recognition of the intersectionality of gender and the
multiplicity of historically and cultural contingent identities.398 Discourse on
violence can emphasize not only the ways in which men victimize women, but the
sites of resistance to encourage women’s own agency in combating the
problem.399 Non-state actors may play a central role in this effort.400
391

Id. at 29.
Id.
393
Id.
394
Article L.213-1 of the French Labor Code banned women’s working at night in any night work
of almost any nature. The European Community Directive 76/207 of February 9, 1976 sets forth a
general principle of equal treatment for men and women workers with respect to working
conditions. The European Court of Justice overruled this French law and condemned the French
Government for failing to eliminate this rule from its labor laws. In November 1998, the
European Commission began a procedure under Article 171 of the Treaty of Rome which allows
the Commission to propose financial sanctions against member states of the European Union
which fail to conform their laws to EU Directives. Eventually, the French government adapted its
laws to comply with European Community Law. See Equality Now, France’s Labor Code,
available
at
http://www.equalitynow.org/english/wan/beijing5/beijing5_economic_en.html.
French and European court cases illustrate the limited policy shift in individual rights as a result of
the Europeanization of gender rights. In a domestic case, decided in La Rochelle, a police court
ruled that Article L.213-1 violated the European Equal Treatment Directive (ETD). On the other
hand, the case of Levy, ruled on by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), acknowledged that while
the French Labor Code had to comply with the ETD, an exception existed because the code
implemented a prior international agreement. See MARIA GREEN COWLES ET AL., TRANSFORMING
EUROPE: EUROPEANIZATION AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 35-36 (2001); see also PAUL P. CRAIG &
GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 919, 926 (2007) (illustrating the
limited policy transition through ECJ cases).
395
Renu Mandhane, The Use of Human Rights Discourse to Secure Women’s Interests: Critical
Analysis of the Implications, 10 MICHIGAN J. OF GENDER AND L. 275 (2004). Mandhane presents
an example of the construction of women as victims in her article on Nepalese women’s rights.
She discusses the Nepalese abortion campaign, which served both as a moment of resistance for
Nepalese women but also as a site where women’s victim status becomes clear.
396
Id.
397
Id. at 36.
398
Id.
399
Id.
400
A final required shift is to examine the implications of non-state actors emerging as significant
contenders to state power. Id. Projecting a woman (i.e.: a sex worker) exclusively in terms of her
392
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We can understand the preeminence of victimhood in the construction of
women’s rights better by reconsidering what Janet Halley calls the Injury Triad.
Women are not innocent in the construction of a sex-based hierarchy. The Injury
Triad, Halley tells us, is “female injury + female innocence + male immunity.”401
This combination of a self-perception of constitutional innocence with a
presumption of guilt on men’s part leads some feminists to draw significant policy
conclusions from circumstances that involve a great deal more nuance. We see the
consequence explains how feminists, despite their inclusive methodology, moved
from consciousness-raising ethos to disregard some of the consequences of their
actions. To connect the dots more closely, the Injury Triad is responsible for the
lack of self-consciousness within women’s human rights efforts.
Feminists may respond to this argument with the point that women are
indeed often victims, and that in violence between sexes, they are far more likely
to be victims, and their victimization surpasses that of men. I do not deny that
this may be the case. The point here, as supported by Kapur, Otto and Halley, is
that solely focusing on these incidences of victimization empties women of their
agency.
V.

Conclusion

CEDAW is the pinnacle of the advancement of women’s human rights.
Underneath it lays gender mainstreaming efforts and other attempts to bring
gender into international law. Unsexing CEDAW would flip the architecture of
international women’s human rights to focus on gender, with women included
under that rights umbrella.
My direct criticism of CEDAW’s text may offend the many feminist
international lawyers who sought the enactment of CEDAW and implemented it
over nearly thirty years. For them, given the beating CEDAW has taken from
conservative forces, it is apostasy to challenge CEDAW. Certainly, these lawyers
have made hard-fought and fragile gains. Moreover, their concerns that criticism
may undermine these gains are real and legitimate.402
That does not dispatch the nagging questions of whether CEDAW’s focus
on women is accurate or effective. It is neither. CEDAW is not accurate because
the real sex and gender engagements must include men, women who are not
victims, transgender people, and even the panoply of gender-related Yogyakarta
experience of victimization and violence ignores her struggle for, and claims to, rights in her
multiple capacities. Id. at 36. Identifying her claims for rights as moments of resistance validates
the sex worker’s agency without invalidating the harms to which she may have been subjected.
Through her claim for rights in these different guises, she challenges legal and non-legal responses
from state and non state actors that treat her exclusively as a victim in need of rescue and
rehabilitation or as a criminal to be incarcerated. Id. Such responses leave her without any tools
with which to fight violence, exploitation, or discrimination. Id.
401
HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 14, at 324.
402
In private conversations, many of its most ardent supporters recognize that were they to redraft
the Convention tabula rasa, they would place “gender,” rather than “women” in the foreground.
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Principles. CEDAW is also not effective – its many successes have still not
yielded the broad transformation promised.
It cannot yield this transformation with the focus on women as a group.
Recognizing what’s wrong with women’s rights requires us to substitute “sex” or
“gender” in the place of “women.” This change is no mere semiotic shift.
“Gender” moves beyond the limits of essentialist notions of womanhood toward
reducing gender inequality and guaranteeing universal human rights.
CEDAW’s problem is a problem for women’s rights as well. Although
such a broad argument is beyond the scope of this paper, the international
women’s rights context reflects the extent to which the focus on women as a
group will fail as long as it ignores the extent to which men are excluded from any
serious consideration. It would be all too easy for feminist to ignore my point as
an ignorant, androcentric backlash against women’s rights. Gender inequalities
box all humans into a preordained set of advantages and disadvantages. With
contemporary understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality serving as the
foundation for a new treaty, international law might come closer to reflecting
reality and pushing it toward greater equality. Unsexing CEDAW is not just a
remedy to a shortcoming in international law, but a model for thinking about
gender issues as a human rights question for all people.
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